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Abstract 
Often insufficient information creates a situation in which we are forced to decide 
under uncertainty. In such a situation the behavior of others can complement private 
information and decisively influence a final decision. In many cases relying on the behavior 
of others is a good strategy and results in more accurate decisions. However, from time to 
time the information derived from the behavior of others is wrong and relying on such 
misleading information can trigger herds with destructive consequences (e.g., on the stock 
market). To better understand how herding behavior develops, methods from computational 
modeling and neuroscience were combined with theories from social psychology and 
economics. In the first manuscript a straightforward categorization task was analyzed with a 
prominent computational model to describe how opinions from others can influence the 
decision process. That people often treat private information in a privileged way is shown in a 
second manuscript. It suggests a neural mechanism on how overweighting of private 
information changes belief updating. Understanding this process is important, as 
overweighting of private information can decrease the probability that herds develop. 
Importantly, if private information is overweighted strongly depends on the type of social 
information, which is shown in a third and final manuscript. The analyses demonstrate that 
private information is only overweighted as compared to social information derived from the 
decisions of equally ranked others, but not as compared to social information derived from 
higher ranked others. In sum, this dissertation sheds light on social influence and the 
development of herding behavior by studying individual decisions on the psychological and 
neural level of implementation. Even herding behavior is a group phenomenon it ultimately 
rests on the wrong decisions of individuals. A better understanding of the associated 
mechanisms is crucial for the understanding of how fatal herds, as the ones on the stock 
market, can develop.  
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Cognitive and Neural Mechanisms of Social Influence in Decision Making 
Approximately seven years after its onset and rapid development into a worldwide 
financial crisis, the implications of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis are still having a 
destructive effect on the lives of many people. According to Robert J. Shiller, winner of the 
2013 Nobel Prize in Economics, the U.S. subprime crisis is based on a speculative bubble in 
the housing market that broke in 2006 (Shiller, 2008). Bubbles in financial markets are an 
emergent phenomenon on the macro-level, but they ultimately rest on the wrong (and 
misleading) decisions of individual agents on the micro-level. Such individual decisions can 
be strongly influenced by the opinions and decisions of other agents (Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004). Even the conventional stock valuation theory assumes “[…] that a stock's current 
market value tends to converge to the (risk adjusted) discounted present value of the rationally 
expected dividend stream.” (Smith, Suchanek, & Williams, 1988), bubbles impressively 
demonstrate that people’s expectations can strongly deviate from this rational prospect. A 
better understanding of the causes that lead to such devastating consequences of financial 
bubbles is a highly interdisciplinary endeavor. It requires the combination of knowledge from 
various scientific disciplines such as economics, sociology, psychology, evolutionary biology 
and neuroeconomics (Baddeley, 2010). The overarching goal of this dissertation was to 
deepen our knowledge of how the mechanisms of decision making are influenced by various 
social factors (e.g., authority or group size). Understanding these mechanisms is essential 
because they can explain how the wrong and misleading decisions that cause financial 
bubbles arise. Three manuscripts report the mechanisms of decision making that were studied 
on the level of cognitive and neural information processing by combining theories from social 
psychology and economics with tools, models and techniques from statistics, cognitive 
psychology and neuroeconomics. In a first manuscript (Huber, Herzog, Horn, Klucharev, & 
Rieskamp, 2014), we report how the cognitive mechanism of social influence (Germar, 
Schlemmer, Krug, Voss, & Mojzisch, 2013) is modulated by an increase in the size of a 
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group. We found that the effect of an increase in group size from one to 19 on the propensity 
to conform goes along with a more efficient processing of sensory information. This 
perceptual bias towards the choice option favored by others is accompanied by a group size 
dependent increase in response cautiousness. These results confirm earlier findings by Germar 
et al. (2013) and bring research on the functional relationship between group size and 
conformity (Bond, 2005) to a round figure. In a second manuscript (Huber, Klucharev, & 
Rieskamp, 2014), we studied how a bias towards private as compared to social information 
modulates belief updating. This question is important for a better understanding of herding 
behavior because the probability that a cascade will start decreases when people put too much 
weight on their own private information (Nöth & Weber, 2003). Our main findings suggest 
that the more people overweight private information, the more activity can be observed in the 
inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and the less activity can be observed in the parietal-
temporal cortex when people update their beliefs by private information. These results on the 
neural level point to a two-fold psychological mechanism with emotional and cognitive risk-
processing components (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). A third and final 
manuscript (Schöbel, Rieskamp, & Huber, 2014) reports how we used computational 
modeling to study how a change in the social environment affects information weighting in 
situations prone to herding behavior. In a first experiment, we replicated the classic urn and 
balls study on rational herding by Anderson and Holt (1997). The main conclusion is that 
people have a general tendency to overweight their own private information. In a second 
experiment, we transferred the abstract urn and balls setting to an ecologically more valid 
environment. We observed that people who made decisions in this more realistic setting 
overweighted decisions from higher ranked individuals as compared to decisions from equally 
ranked peers. Weighting of social information seems to depend strongly on authority 
information – an often neglected factor in previous studies. As already mentioned, all three 
manuscripts have the common overarching goal of deepening our knowledge of the cognitive 
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and neural mechanisms underlying social influence in decision making. The remainder of this 
framework consists of two parts. In a first part, the reader will be provided with a short 
historical and theoretical overview of the previous work on which this dissertation is built. 
This first part is essential for understanding the second and final part of the framework: A 
short summary of all three manuscripts. 
Fundamentals of Herding Behavior: Theories From Psychology and Economics 
According to Raafat, Chater, and Frith (2009), herding can be “[…] defined as the 
alignment of the thoughts or behaviors of individuals in a group (herd) through local 
interaction and without centralized coordination.” The general taxonomy introduced by these 
authors distinguishes between global, pattern-based (i.e., connections between agents) and 
local, transmission-based (i.e., exchange of information between agents) mechanisms of 
herding. Importantly, these two mechanisms almost always work in a highly interconnected 
way. However, the work described in this dissertation builds more heavily on the idea of 
transmission-based mechanisms and predominantly on the cognitive (as compared to the 
affective) aspects of herding behavior. Theories from social psychology as well as rational 
models (e.g., informational cascades) developed in economics build the core of this branch of 
herding research. In order to develop paradigms that are optimally suited to studying the 
cognitive and neural mechanisms of social influence in decision making, we combined the 
advantages of both approaches. They will be described in the following two paragraphs. 
In the field of social psychology the early work of Solomon Asch (1951, 1952, 1955, 
1956) is regarded by many as the starting point of conformity research. In his classic 
experiments on the line judgment task, Asch confronted participants with lines of different 
length. The seemingly simple task was to decide which of these lines has equal length to an 
additionally presented reference line. The task was indeed very simple – participants who 
solved this problem alone in the control condition made almost no mistakes. However, 
participants in the experimental condition, who solved the problem after several confederates 
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unanimously stated a wrong answer, made mistakes in more than a third of the trials and only 
about every fourth participant did not make any mistakes at all. Asch recognized that 
increasing the group size can lead to an increase in the propensity to conform. However, the 
idea that a majority size of three already exerts the full impact is nowadays questioned (Bond 
(2005) provides an excellent review of this topic). 
Initial research on conformity had a tendency to highlight the negative side of social 
influence (Larrick, Mannes, & Soll, 2012). According to this view, people put too much 
weight on the information provided by others. Importantly, Morton Deutsch and Harold B. 
Gerard (1955) pointed out that one has to distinguish between informational and normative 
social influence. Informational social influence refers to people’s motivation to gain a more 
accurate perception of reality, whereas normative social influence refers to people’s 
motivation to be an accepted member of a group. Here, relying on other people’s 
informational social influence can often improve decisions (Larrick, Mannes, & Soll, 2012; 
Mannes, 2009; Surowiecki, 2005), whereas only following others because of their normative 
social influence can be both good and bad, depending on the situation. Although initial 
pioneers in the field of conformity research did not distinguish between these two concepts, 
newer research tends to focus more strongly on the advantages of following others. 
Interestingly, researchers studying advice-taking (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Yaniv, 2004; 
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) found that – contrary to the classic view – people sometimes 
even put too low a weight on the opinions of others (egocentric advice discounting). This 
view on conformity is partly supported by a second branch of research that originated in 
economics – the research on informational cascades (Anderson & Holt, 1997; Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992). 
About forty years after the initial work in the field of social psychology, researchers in 
the field of economics started to study herding behavior with a radically different approach. 
Theories following this approach are built on the assumptions of rational expectations theory; 
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that is, they assume independent, rational and self-interested agents who use all the available 
information without making systematic mistakes (Baddeley, 2010). Such rational herding 
models have been widely used to explain people’s behavior in the lab (Anderson & Holt, 
1997; Hung & Plott, 2001), in the labor market (Oberholzer-Gee, 2008), and in financial 
markets (Chari & Kehoe, 2004; Devenow & Welch, 1996). Probably the most prominent 
among these rational herding models is the theory of informational cascades. Informational 
cascades demonstrate that when people decide sequentially without revealing their private 
information, situations can occur in which following the precedent others and deciding 
against one’s own private information can be the best one can do. If people follow the 
underlying assumption of the model to a sufficient degree (that is, if they update their beliefs 
in a way which is consistent with the normative solution provided by Bayes), herds will occur 
even though people did the best they could have done in a particular situation. However, 
research has shown that people often tend to overweight their own private information, even 
in situations in which it would be best for them to follow others (Weizsäcker, 2010). 
Importantly, such overconfident overweighting of private information can decrease the 
probability that cascades start and/or persist (Bernardo & Welch, 2001; Nöth & Weber, 2003). 
A major goal of this dissertation is a better understanding of how the cognitive process of 
belief updating is influenced by changes in the environment (Schöbel et al., 2014) and how a 
bias towards private information modulates the neural mechanism underlying belief updating 
(Huber, Klucharev, & Rieskamp, 2014). 
The outlined research in social psychology and economics has shown that (a) people’s 
decisions are influenced by others (in a good and in a bad way), (b) this influence can depend 
on the specific characteristics of the environment (normative vs. informational social 
influence, group size, …), and (c) people in certain situations tend to overweight their own 
private as compared to the available social information. Understanding the cognitive and 
neural mechanisms of social influence in decision making requires some knowledge of how 
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these mechanisms work in general that is without social influence. The next section will 
therefore provide the reader with some fundamentals on the neural mechanisms of belief 
updating and decision making under uncertainty. In a subsequent section, a short introduction 
to the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978) exemplifies how mathematical models of decision 
making can help to disentangle the cognitive mechanisms underlying social influence. 
The Neural Basis of Belief Updating and Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
When faced with the question of which of several financial products she should invest 
her money in, a real-world decision maker most often cannot relate these choice options to 
exact success probabilities. Early 20th century economist Frank H. Knight (1921) introduced 
the now famous distinction between risk and uncertainty. In situations in which an agent 
decides under risk, outcome probabilities (and outcomes) are known (that is, they can be 
logically deduced or inferred from data), whereas in situations of uncertainty information on 
outcome probabilities is not available (Meder, Le Lec, & Osman, 2013). Ambiguity refers to 
situations in which both – probabilities and outcomes – can be uncertain and Daniel Ellsberg 
(1961) famously demonstrated that people generally are ambiguity averse. Meder et al. (2013) 
pointed out that the differentiation between the two concepts risk and uncertainty can be 
problematic. It is often very difficult to qualitatively discriminate between mechanisms of 
decision making under risk and uncertainty. Therefore, in this dissertation the term 
uncertainty refers to all forms of uncertainty (including risk), especially in the context of the 
neural underpinnings of uncertainty. 
Several brain structures – among others, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), 
the anterior insula, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the parietal cortex – have 
been associated with the neural mechanism underlying decision making under uncertainty 
(Bach & Dolan, 2012; Mohr, Biele, & Heekeren, 2010; Platt & Huettel, 2008). The different 
brain structures of this network were associated with different sub processes of decision 
making under uncertainty. According to a recent meta-analysis by Mohr et al. (2010), the 
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anterior insula (together with the thalamus) is thought to be part of an emotional circuitry. The 
DMPFC, on the other hand, seems to be involved in more cognitive aspects. Finally, together 
with the parietal cortex, the DLPFC (Huettel, 2006; Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2005) is 
thought to be important for the process of forming a decision and selecting an action. 
Interestingly, this last finding was confirmed by a study of Stern, Gonzalez, Welsh, and 
Taylor (2010), which also found fronto-parietal brain structures to be active while participants 
executed a decision. Additionally, this paper described a neural mechanism of belief updating 
by showing that the activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate is related to objective uncertainty 
while participants accumulate evidence. Another study (D’Acremont, Schultz, & Bossaerts, 
2013) distinguished the process of evidence accumulation (objective frequencies) from the 
process of tracking of Bayesian posterior probabilities (objective frequencies in combination 
with prior information). Here, evidence accumulation was found to be associated with activity 
in angular gyri, posterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex, whereas tracking of Bayesian 
posterior probabilities was related to activity in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus. The two 
studies just described, demonstrate in an exemplary way that the neural mechanism of belief 
updating is not yet as well understood as the more general neural mechanism of decision 
making under uncertainty. Huber, Klucharev, & Rieskamp, 2014 provide evidence for the 
idea that specific parts of the neural network of decision making under uncertainty are 
modulated by the weight people give to their own private as compared to social information 
while they update their beliefs. As information integration in cascade situations is ultimately 
nothing other than belief updating in a social environment, a better knowledge of these 
mechanisms is crucial for better understanding the causes that lead to informational cascades. 
In order to study such complex psychological (and neural) processes as those involved 
in sequential decision making (Gluth, Rieskamp, & Büchel, 2012) or belief updating 
(D’Acremont et al., 2013; Stern et al., 2010), the application of computational models has 
become increasingly popular. The goal of these computational models is to translate a 
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complex and noisy data set (often with several dependent variables) into a set of 
psychologically interpretable parameters. Two prominent examples, which were also applied 
in the field of neuroeconomics, are reinforcement learning models (O’Doherty, Dayan, 
Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2004) and random walk or diffusion 
process models (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & 
Forstmann, 2012; Philiastides, Auksztulewicz, Heekeren, & Blankenburg, 2011; Philiastides, 
Ratcliff, & Sajda, 2006). The advantage of computational models for psychology in general 
and for the study of social influence in particular will be highlighted in the next section. This 
section especially highlights the diffusion model because, as described in the first manuscript 
of this dissertation (Huber, Herzog et al., 2014), this model was used to study how the 
cognitive mechanism of social influence (Germar et al., 2013) is modulated by an increase in 
group size. 
The Drift-diffusion Model – Advantages of Model Based Social Science 
More than thirty years have passed since Roger Ratcliff introduced the model known 
as drift-diffusion model (1978). The diffusion model has been widely used to study two-
alternative forced choice tasks in the field of cognitive psychology (see Voss, Nagler, & 
Lerche, 2013 for a good introduction) and more recently in the field of social psychology 
(Germar et al., 2013; Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Philiastides & 
Ratcliff, 2013). Interestingly, it took quite some time before the model became more generally 
accepted. The exponential change in citations of “Rafcliff (1978)” since approximately the 
mid-nineties nicely reflects this increased interest in the diffusion model (Voss et al., 2013). 
The very general idea of cognitive models is to build a bridge between behavioral (and/or 
neural) data and latent psychological processes (Forstmann, Wagenmakers, Eichele, Brown, 
& Serences, 2011). Cognitive modeling is a very powerful tool. It forces researchers to 
translate verbal hypotheses into mathematical equations and to make quantitative predictions 
and comparisons of these different hypotheses (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2010). Most often 
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cognitive models have not only fixed parameters, but also free parameters, which are 
estimated by fitting a model to data. This can be performed using traditional statistics (e.g., 
maximum likelihood or least squares) or – as has been done several times in this dissertation 
(Huber, Klucharev, & Rieskamp, 2014; Schöbel et al., 2014) – by using Bayesian statistics 
(Kruschke, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). The drift-diffusion model has seven free parameters 
(Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Voss et al., 2013; Wagenmakers, 2009), but often 
researchers focus on only four of these seven. These four parameters can be clearly 
interpreted in terms of latent cognitive processes, which has been empirically shown several 
times (Ratcliff, 2002; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). The drift rate is higher the more 
easily a stimuli can be encoded and is therefore affected by task difficulty. The (relative) 
starting point reflects an a priori bias towards one of the two decision options. The boundary 
separation can be understood as response cautiousness – the higher the boundary separation 
the more evidence a participant needs in order to make a decision. This parameter – together 
with the (relative) starting point – is thought to be under subjective control of an individual 
(Wagenmakers, 2009). Last, but not least, the non-decision time parameter reflects the time 
needed for processes, such as motor preparation, that are not part of the actual decision. The 
drift-diffusion model takes into account all relevant data (that is, the response time 
distributions for correct and wrong decisions as well as accuracies) and transforms them into 
psychologically interpretable parameters. In recent years, this approach has become 
increasingly popular for studying social phenomenon, e.g., to gain a better understanding of 
the underlying cognitive processes of the implicit association test (Klauer et al., 2007), 
branding (Philiastides & Ratcliff, 2013), and social influence (Germar et al., 2013). The first 
manuscript of this dissertation (Huber, Herzog et al., 2014), which will be described in the 
next section, shows how the general cognitive mechanism of social influence is modulated by 
an increase of group size. 
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Why Does Social Influence Increase With Group Size? 
Huber, R. E., Herzog, S. M., Horn, S. S., Klucharev, V., & Rieskamp, J. (2014). Why 
Does Social Influence Increase With Group Size? A Diffusion Model Analysis. 
Since Solomon Asch’s famous studies on the line judgment task (1952, 1956) it has 
become well known that the opinions of others can strongly influence individuals’ decisions. 
Even in his very early work, Asch (1951, 1955) recognized that the size of a group can 
decisively moderate the effect that others have on individuals’ decisions. Since these early 
days, much research has been carried out and several theories try to functionally relate group 
size to conformity (see Bond, 2005 for a review and meta-analysis). Most of these theories 
point to a curvilinear relationship (Asch, 1951; Latané, 1981; Latané & Wolf, 1981; 
MacCoun, 2012; Mullen, 1983; Tanford & Penrod, 1984), but newer research shows that 
sometimes a linear relationship can do the job just as well, especially for increases in group 
size above two (Bond, 2005). Although the functional relationship between group size and 
conformity has been studied extensively, the same cannot be said about the underlying 
psychological mechanism. Germar et al. (2013) were the first who successfully applied the 
diffusion model in order to show that social influence mainly affects perceptual bias and 
response cautiousness. The initially very plausible alternative hypothesis of a change in 
judgmental bias was not supported by their data. This is an important finding: The core 
mechanism of social influence in perceptual decision making seems to be a change in a 
subjectively uncontrollable mechanism (the ease of encoding). Although it should be 
mentioned that people also required more evidence before they made a decision – a factor that 
is thought to be under subjective control (Wagenmakers, 2009) – the second important bias 
parameter (relative starting point) does not seem to be part of the psychological mechanism of 
social influence. Although Germar et al.'s (2013) study was able to show a convincing 
psychological mechanism of social influence, they did not answer the important question of 
how an increase in group size could alter this mechanism. To answer this question, we 
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combined the face-versus-car categorization task (Philiastides et al., 2011) with group 
opinions and applied the diffusion model to further disentangle the psychological mechanism. 
This approach allowed us to test whether an increase in group size leads to a change in the 
general mechanism proposed by Germar et al. (2013) or whether group size affects an 
additional parameter, which is not affected by social influence in general (e.g., the relative 
starting point). Our results support the conclusion that social influence is mainly due to a 
change in perceptual bias as well as due to a change in boundary separation and show that an 
increase in group size mainly leads to a parametrical change in the general mechanism of 
social influence (Germar et al., 2013). Interestingly, the pattern that we found seems to be 
somewhat incompatible with a linear model of group size and social influence. An increase in 
group size from zero to one leads to a comparable increase in the relevant parameter values 
(drift rate and boundary separation) to an increase in group size from one to 19. If the pattern 
was linear, an increase in group size from one to 19 should be much larger than an increase 
from zero to one. However, although these findings can be related to research trying to 
functionally relate group size and conformity (Bond, 2005), they are exploratory in nature and 
have to be confirmed with future studies. This study offers a plausible explanation of how 
group size could influence the psychological mechanism leading to an increase in social 
influence – knowledge that complements research on the functional relationship between 
these two variables. 
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Neural Correlates of Informational Cascades 
Huber, R. E., Klucharev, V. & Rieskamp, J. (2014). Neural Correlates of 
Informational Cascades: Brain Mechanisms of Social Influence on Belief Updating. 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
In recent years, developments in the global economy have impressively demonstrated 
which disruptive forces can grow up from financial bubbles. Based on the assumption of 
rationally acting agents, the theory on informational cascades (Anderson & Holt, 1997; 
Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992) has offered an explanation of how financial 
bubbles as well as other forms of herds can emerge from a series of correct, but unfortunate, 
decisions. In such sequential decision problems, people can base their decisions on social 
information deduced from the decisions of preceding others and on private information that is 
known only to them. Here, situations can occur in which an individual is confronted with 
prior evidence from social information that is more convincing and contrary to the evidence 
provided by the individual’s private information. In these so-called informational cascades, 
individuals are thought to integrate social and private information according to a process of 
Bayesian belief updating. A decision maker who acts as suggested by the normative Bayesian 
solution weights each piece of evidence equally before deciding on a final choice option. 
Importantly, previous studies have shown that people do not always act in harmony with this 
solution, but sometimes deviate by integrating the available information with a bias towards 
their own private signal1 (Bernardo & Welch, 2001; Nöth & Weber, 2003; Weizsäcker, 2010). 
Individuals who update their beliefs in an “overconfident”, biased way increase the 
probability that cascades do not occur in the first place or terminate prematurely. 
In the study presented here, participants in a hypothetical decision scenario acted as 
stock market traders who have to repeatedly decide which of two stocks they want to buy. 
                                                
1 Note, that in indifferent situations (i.e., in situations in which social information provides the same amount of 
evidence as private information, but for the opposite choice option) it can be rational to give a slightly higher 
weight to one’s own private information, if there is a probability > 0 that one of the previous decision makers 
decided wrongly (Anderson & Holt, 1997). 
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This paradigm can be seen as an adapted version of the classic informational cascades 
paradigm (Anderson & Holt, 1997). In combination with fMRI and computational modeling 
this paradigm enabled us to study the cognitive and neural underpinnings of (biased) belief 
updating in a social environment; that is, the (psychological) mechanisms on which the 
development of informational cascades finally rests. Before participants decided which of the 
two stocks they wanted to buy and provided a final (success) probability judgment, they were 
sequentially confronted with two decisions of previous traders and an own private 
recommendation from a rating agency. There are three basic hypotheses: (a) all three pieces 
of information are weighted differently, (b) social and private information are weighted 
differently, and (c) all the available information is weighted according to the assumptions of 
the normative Bayesian solution. All three hypotheses were translated to computational 
models and compared on a behavioral level. 
The behavioral analyses show that participants’ choices were, in the vast majority of 
cases, compatible with the normative Bayesian solution. This, however, is not the case for the 
probability judgments, where participants’ behavior revealed a general tendency towards 
overweighting of private signals (corresponds to hypothesis b). Interestingly, the more people 
overweighted private information the less they started a cascade in situations specifically 
prone to herding. On the neural level, studies conducted in decision neuroscience have 
convincingly shown that brain structures such as the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula, the 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and the 
parietal cortex (among others) are involved in the processes of belief updating and decision 
execution in decision making under uncertainty (D’Acremont et al., 2013; Mohr et al., 2010; 
Stern et al., 2010). However, this study goes a step further by postulating a potential 
mechanism of how the neural underpinnings of belief updating are modulated by a bias 
towards private information. The more uncertain participants became as a result of belief 
updating by private information the more brain activity was observed in the DLPFC, DMPFC, 
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inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and in the parietal-temporal cortex. Importantly, this 
process seems to be modulated by how participants weight private as compared to social 
information: The more participants overweighted private information, the more activity was 
observed in inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and the less activity was observed in the 
parietal-temporal cortex during belief updating by private information. All in all, this study 
suggests a neural mechanism underlying biased belief updating – the process that can 
decisively modulate the probability that cascades occur. 
Social Influences in Sequential Decision Making 
Schöbel, M.,. Rieskamp, J, & Huber, R. E. (2014). Social Influences in Sequential 
Decision Making. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
According to a prominent theory in social psychology, conformity influences people’s 
behavior via two different routes: informational and normative social influence (Deutsch & 
Gerard, 1955). This dual-process perspective separates people’s motivation to gain a valid and 
accurate perception of reality (informational social influence) from people’s motivation to act 
in accordance with the positive expectations of others (normative social influence). Normative 
social influence is thought to be stronger in tasks in which people have to respond in public, 
whereas informational social influence seems to predominate when people can provide their 
answers privately (Bond, 2005). However, social expectations can influence people’s 
behavior in private task settings as well (Wood, 2000). Therefore, the distinction between 
internalization of beliefs as compared to (public) compliance (Festinger, 1953; Moscovici, 
1980) cannot easily be simplified to private versus public task settings. Even most conformity 
researchers seem to agree that (at least) two types of conformity processes exist, it has been 
difficult to experimentally separate and quantitatively distinguish these two forces. How these 
two processes interact is a major question in the field of social psychology (Allen, 1965; 
Levine & Russo, 1987; Tajfel, 1969). 
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The theory of informational cascades (Anderson & Holt, 1997; Banerjee, 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al., 1992) describes how people integrate private and publicly available 
social information. According to this theory, people update their beliefs in line with the 
assumptions of rational expectations theory; that is, they act in a Bayesian optimal way 
(Baddeley, 2010). Although this theory has been successfully applied to describe the 
occurrence of herds, e.g., in financial markets (Chari & Kehoe, 2004), it has mostly neglected 
the existence of different social influence processes. In this study, we combined the dual-
process concept of conformity and the paradigm of informational cascades with 
computational modeling in order to quantitatively disentangle informational and normative 
social influence. 
In a first study (Experiment 1), we replicated the general findings of Anderson and 
Holt (1997) and showed that people act in accordance with the informational influence 
hypothesis, which states that people will base their decisions on both private and social 
information. The results from our social influence model show that people have a tendency to 
overweight their own private as compared to the publicly available social information. This 
violation of rational expectations theory can decrease the probability that a cascade occurs 
and has already been discussed previously (Bernardo & Welch, 2001; Nöth & Weber, 2003; 
Weizsäcker, 2010). 
In a second study (Experiment 2), participants solved the abstract informational 
cascades paradigm in an ecologically more realistic medical decision making context. Here, 
participants acting as assistant physicians had to decide which of two different diseases a 
patient suffers from. Both diseases were associated with the same symptoms, but they 
occurred with a different likelihood. By introducing two types of social opinion sources – that 
is (a) hierarchically higher ranked medical directors and (b) hierarchically equally ranked 
assistant physicians – we were able to test a form of normative social influence that is based 
on authority (Milgram, 1974). The results show that decisions in favor of private information 
Cognitive and neural mechanisms of social influence in decision making 20 
as well as confidence ratings (i.e., probability judgments) were consistently lower in the 
authority condition as compared to the baseline condition when the authority opinion was 
contrary to private information. In indifference situations, 61.5% of all participants decided 
against their private information when confronted with opposing social information derived 
from medical directors’ opinions. This is in a strong contrast to Experiment 1, where in 
indifference situations 79.9% of all participants decided according to their private 
information. These results clearly show that authority influence can have a strong impact on 
the development of informational cascades. This is also reflected in the results of the social 
influence model, which shows that private information is only overweighted as compared to 
social information from equally ranked assistant physicians but not as compared to social 
information from higher ranked medical directors. 
We can conclude that (a) it is possible to quantitatively separate normative from 
informational social influence, (b) it is important for the theory of informational cascades to 
incorporate different sources of social influence, and (c) it is recommended to focus not only 
on the individual but also on the environment in which individuals decide, when the goal is to 
improve the (group) outcome in sequential decision making problems. 
General Discussion 
Herding behavior on the group level is always based on wrong decisions on the 
individual level. As a consequence, we can only fully understand herding behavior (e.g., in 
stock markets), if we know how such wrong decisions are psychologically implemented on 
the level of the individual. In three manuscripts (Huber, Herzog et al., 2014; Huber, 
Klucharev, & Rieskamp, 2014; Schöbel et al., 2014) mathematical tools from computational 
modeling and neuroscience were combined with theories and paradigms from social 
psychology and economics to study the psychological mechanisms of social influence in 
decision making. There are three main conclusions: (1) Stronger social influence, due to an 
increase in group size, leads to a stronger bias in sensory information uptake and to an 
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increase in response caution (Huber, Herzog et al., 2014). (2) Others can create a social 
environment in which we overweight private as compared to social information and this effect 
seems to be accompanied by specific changes in the neural network of belief updating (Huber, 
Klucharev, & Rieskamp, 2014). (3) How people weight private as compared to social 
information depends on the specific characteristics of the social environment and authority 
increases the weight assigned to social information. 
The first manuscript (Huber, Herzog et al., 2014) demonstrates that social influence in 
perceptual decision making can result from a bias in sensory information uptake and an 
increase in response caution. Interestingly, others seem to influence how we “see” the world 
and this effect is stronger for opinions from 19 others as compared to the opinion of a single 
other. The interpretation that we “see” the world differently could be tested in future studies 
by using the method described in Huber, Herzog et al. (2014) in combination with brain 
imaging techniques (e.g., fMRI). On the one hand this would provide us with deeper insights 
on how social influence modulates the mechanisms of decision making and on the other hand 
this could also further validate the psychological interpretation of the parameters of the drift-
diffusion model. Further, it would be interesting to know, if the psychological mechanism 
described in Huber, Herzog et al. (2014) can also explain social influence in situations in 
which there is no a priori defined correct choice option (e.g., preference for a politician, music 
star or food item) or in situations in which choice options and their outcomes are coupled in a 
probabilistic (as compared to a deterministic) way. 
In Huber, Klucharev, and Rieskamp (2014) we used cognitive modeling and fMRI to 
study how people integrate social and private information. In the studied environment, we 
observed that people overweight their own private as compared to the social information and 
that this overweighting alters the neural mechanism of belief updating. It is important to better 
understand how and why people overweight private information because overweighting of 
private information decreases the probability that herding in the form of informational 
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cascades occurs. The results on the neural level point to a dual-process mechanism with 
emotional and cognitive components. Here, it would be important to replicate these findings 
(also with other methods) to provide further evidence for the postulated neural mechanism. 
Additional knowledge could be gained by changing the social environment (e.g., as in 
Schöbel et al., 2014) to test, if the same neural mechanism can explain belief updating in 
different social contexts. 
In a third and last manuscript Schöbel et al. (2014) experimentally manipulated the 
social status of others. This resulted in people giving more weight to social information 
derived from higher ranked as compared to equally ranked individuals and private 
information was only overweighted as compared to equally ranked peers. This knowledge 
should be incorporated in future studies on informational cascades because a change in the 
weight assigned to different sources of information also changes the probability with which 
cascades occur. If information of people with a higher social status is also overweighted by 
decision makers in a professional environment (e.g., medical doctors in a hospital or stock 
market traders) was not tested and would be a promising idea for future research. 
In sum, this dissertation describes different psychological mechanisms of social 
influence in decision making. These mechanisms can help us understand how the social 
environment, in which we all decide, can bias important decisions – a process which can 
result in destructive herds as can be observed again and again in financial markets.  
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small group. Modeling the data with the diffusion model revealed that an increase in social 
influence leads to an increase in the perceptual bias towards a choice option, but at the same 
time to an increase in response cautiousness. In sum, our cognitive modeling approach 
illustrates how social influence affects fundamental cognitive judgment processes. 
Keywords: social influence, conformity, group size, drift-diffusion model, decision 
making, judgment processes, perceptual discrimination  
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Why Does Social Influence Increase With Group Size? 
A Diffusion Model Analysis 
In his pioneering work on social influence Solomon Asch (1952, 1956) impressively 
demonstrated how group opinions can influence decision making. Since Asch’s initial 
research the social influence of group opinions on individual judgments has been replicated 
numerous times (Bond & Smith, 1996). The size of a group is a well-known moderator of this 
effect (Bond, 2005), with larger groups leading to stronger social influence. Prominent 
theories examining the association between group size and social influence primarily focused 
on the mathematical relationship between these two variables (Latané, 1981; Latané & Wolf, 
1981; MacCoun, 2012; Mullen, 1983; Tanford & Penrod, 1984). However, how group size 
affects the underlying cognitive mechanism of the judgment process is not yet fully 
understood. To overcome this lack of knowledge we examined social influence using an 
adapted version of the face-versus-car categorization task (Philiastides, Auksztulewicz, 
Heekeren, & Blankenburg, 2011). In the classic version of the task people have to decide 
without any further information whether a dynamic noisy visual stimuli depicts a face or a 
car. In our version of the task people were a priori informed about the opinion of a single 
other person (1), the opinion of a majority of 19 other persons (2) or they were not informed 
about the opinion of others (3). To understand the psychological mechanism of increased 
social influence resulting from an increase in group size we modeled the data using the drift-
diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978). 
Group Size and Social Influence 
Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) dual-process view separates normative from 
informational social influence. Whereas normative social influence acts on an individual’s 
desire to be socially approved, informational social influence describes the motivation to get a 
more accurate perception of reality (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). In his meta-analysis on 
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group size and social influence Bond (2005) differentiated between Asch-type (face-to-face) 
and Crutchfield-type (individual booths with false group feedback) tasks with private and 
public response formats. For a Crutchfield-type task setting with private responses (including 
a majority size of one) – comparable to the research presented in this paper – curvilinear 
models explain the relationship between group size and social influence slightly better than 
simple linear models. Whereas the initial research by Asch (1951, 1955) as well as the Social 
Influence model by Tanford and Penrod (1984) assume an asymptotic satiation of social 
influence (e.g., at a group size of three) other theories, such as the Social Impact theory 
(Latané, 1981; Latané & Wolf, 1981) or the Other-Total Ratio theory (Mullen, 1983) 
proposed a negatively accelerated function without an asymptotic limit (Bond, 2005). 
Recently, MacCoun (2012) introduced the Burden of Social Proof model as a promising 
addition to existing theories. Different variants of this logistic threshold model can 
successfully mimic various previous theories. 
Interestingly, recent research on the wisdom of the crowds effect (Larrick, Mannes, & 
Soll, 2012; Surowiecki, 2005) provides additional evidence for a curvilinear relationship 
between group size and (informational) social influence. Integrating an individual opinion 
with the opinions of others according to a unit-weight strategy that weights both types of 
opinions equally also results in a negatively accelerated curve (Mannes, 2009). According to a 
unit-weight strategy an individual opinion and the opinion of one other person both receive an 
equal weight of .50. When confronted with the opinion of 19 others, the opinion of every 
person, as well as that of the individual, receives an equal weight of 1/20, which results in a 
total weight of 19/20 for the group. As a consequence, the increase in the weight assigned to a 
group opinion, caused by an additional member of a group, strongly diminishes with an 
increase in group size. Mannes (2009) concluded that, although people tend to (strongly) 
underweight information provided by large groups, they seem to recognize that larger groups 
are generally more accurate than small groups or individuals. 
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In sum, all prominent theories (1) agree that an increase in group size leads to an 
increase of social influence, (2) mainly focus on the mathematical relationship between group 
size and social influence and (3) do not provide a detailed account of the underlying 
psychological mechanism of social influence. 
Although the mathematical relationship between group size and social influence has 
been studied extensively there appears to be a lack of knowledge of how group size affects the 
judgment process on a psychological level. By using the drift-diffusion model we open this 
black box and show that the effect of group size on social influence can be explained by a 
modulation of the general psychological mechanism underlying social influence (see also 
Germar, Schlemmer, Krug, Voss, & Mojzisch, 2013). 
Decomposing Psychological Mechanisms With Sequential Sampling Models 
The drift-diffusion model introduced by Ratcliff (1978) belongs to the general class of 
sequential sampling models. The basic idea of many sequential sampling models is that when 
presented with a stimuli people start to accumulate evidence for the different choice options 
until a decision threshold is crossed and a decision is executed (see also Gold & Shadlen, 
2007). These models have been applied to a wide variety of cognitive tasks including sensory 
detection (Smith, 1995), perceptual discrimination (Laming, 1968; Link & Heath, 1975; 
Usher & McClelland, 2001; Vickers, 1979), categorization (Ashby, 2000; Nosofsky & 
Palmeri, 1997), probabilistic inference (Wallsten & Barton, 1982), and memory recognition 
(Ratcliff, 1978). Sequential sampling models have also been successfully applied for value-
based decision making (Aschenbrenner, Albert, & Schmalhofer, 1984; Fehr & Rangel, 2011; 
Gluth, Rieskamp, & Büchel, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Guo & Holyoak, 2002; Rieskamp, 2008; 
Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; Usher & McClelland, 2004). 
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The drift-diffusion model in particular has successfully accounted for behavioral data 
that is, the shapes of the response time distributions and accuracy from a wide variety of rapid 
two-choice decision tasks (see Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013, for 
reviews). By assuming that evidence from a stimulus is dynamically accumulated over time 
(starting from a point z) until an internal boundary is crossed, the model disentangles the 
efficiency of the accumulation process (drift rate parameter v), the amount of information 
required for the decision (boundary separation a), peripheral nondecision time (Ter; e.g., 
encoding and response execution time), and variability in these components across trials. The 
drift-diffusion model has also proven to be a very useful tool to better understand the 
processes involved in social cognition, such as implicit associations (Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, 
& Teige-Mocigemba, 2007), racial bias (Klauer & Voss, 2008), or the effects of branding 
(Philiastides & Ratcliff, 2013). 
Germar et al. (2013) were the first to use the drift-diffusion model to show that social 
influence primarily results in people accumulating evidence for the recommended choice 
option more efficiently (“perceptual bias”). Additionally, people were more cautious (that is, 
they required more information before they made a decision) when in a situation of social 
influence. Somewhat surprisingly, social influence did not result in an a priori bias toward a 
choice option (“judgmental bias”). The findings of Germar et al. (2013) provide first insights 
into how social influence changes the judgment process. However, how an increase in social 
influence resulting from an increase in group size affects the judgment process is still unclear 
and different psychological mechanisms could go along with this modulatory effect of group 
size. On the one hand, larger group sizes could lead to a linear or non-linear increase in the 
perceptual bias suggested by Germar et al. (2013). According to the drift-diffusion model 
such a change in only the drift rate would result in faster and more accurate judgments. On the 
other hand, an increase in group size could also result in people being increasingly biased 
toward the opinion suggested by a group a priori, that is before the actual stimulus is 
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presented. For such a situation, in which only the relative starting point moves, the drift-
diffusion model would predict faster judgments for the suggested choice option and slower 
judgments for the alternative choice option. One can also think of alternative hypotheses, such 
as a combination of these two mechanisms or an additional inclusion of a third parameter 
(e.g., the boundary separation). Here, we show that an increase in group size primarily results 
in people processing the recommended stimuli more efficiently, but also in an increase in 
response cautiousness. Group size seems to affect this mechanism in a nonlinear way. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-one students from the University of Basel, Switzerland, participated in the 
experiment (M = 23.2, SD = 3.3 years; 27 female). The study took approximately 2.5 hours 
after which every participant received 50 CHF plus a variable, performance-contingent bonus 
of 0.04 CHF for each correct response (M = 8.82 CHF; SD = 1.32 CHF; range: 7.00-12.00 
CHF). 
Procedures and Design 
Each participant performed a modified version of the face-versus-car categorization 
task (Philiastides et al., 2011). Participants were informed that they were taking part in a study 
that aims for a better understanding of the processes underlying object recognition in groups 
and that the task could be understood as a training session implemented on a popular social 
media platform. At the beginning of every trial, participants were confronted with cues 
representing the fictitious opinion of a single individual or a majority of a group of 19 
individuals about the category – face or car – of the upcoming stimulus. Next, participants 
were confronted with dynamic noisy visual stimuli (i.e., short “movies”) of faces or cars and 
had to decide which of the two was presented. Participants indicated their rating by pressing 
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the appropriate button (counter-balanced left/right between subjects). Because we tried to 
minimize learning over time, feedback was provided only at the end of the study. We 
informed participants that cars and faces were presented with equal probability (i.e., 50%). 
Participants were instructed to solve the task as accurately and as quickly as possible. The 
experiment started after a short training period. 
Pictures of twenty different faces and twenty different cars were used to create 
dynamic noisy visual stimuli (grayscale images, 8-bit, 256 levels, 500*500 px - see 
Philiastides et al., 2011 for details) by varying the percentage of phase coherence of each 
image (see Dakin, Hess, Ledgeway, & Achtman, 2002; Rainer, Augath, Trinath, & 
Logothetis, 2001 for a detailed description of the algorithms). Each of the 40 stimuli consisted 
of 30 different frames. The frames were presented at a rate of one frame/50ms and the 
presentation ended as soon as a participant decided for an option or after 1.5s the latest. Noise 
was kept constant by using the same percentage of phase coherence across frames. 
Social influence was manipulated in three conditions. In two conditions we used visual 
cues indicating the opinion either of the majority of a large group consisting of 19 fictitious 
people (“large group condition”) or of a single other individual (“small group condition”). In a 
third condition participants received uninformative visual cues (“control condition” – see 
Figure 1). To create a more realistic environment in which the opinions of others can also be 
wrong, opinion cues in the small and large group condition were correct in only 70% of all 
cases. Importantly, to avoid any biases, opinion cues indicated the correct solution for faces 
and for cars equally often. The three conditions were presented in a randomized way in three 
blocks (not to be confused with the three conditions) consisting of twelve mini-blocks with 
ten stimuli/mini-block. Participants decided in overall 360 trials, in which each mini-block 
contained stimuli of only one condition (i.e., 12 mini-blocks or 120 stimuli per condition). 
The three conditions were presented repeatedly in a fixed order of mini blocks. The order was 
fixed within a participant, but varied between participants. Four different randomizations – 
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control/large group/small group, large group/small group/control, small group/control/large 
group and small group/large group/control – were used. After 60, 120, 180 and 300 trials a 
short self-paced break allowed participants to relax. 
Calibration: Noise Level 
The noise level was calibrated in a pre-study for every participant individually in a 
way that aimed for an average accuracy of 60% in the control condition. With an accuracy 
level of 60% in the control condition, the group opinions with an accuracy of 70% provided 
useful information that allowed participants to improve their judgments. Thus, participants 
were incentivized to integrate both sources of evidence, that is, social (opinion cues) and 
private (dynamic stimuli). Importantly, if participants had blindly followed the opinion cues 
in the small and/or large group condition, their accuracy would have been 0% for wrong 
opinions and 100% for correct opinions. Our results (see Accuracies and Response Times) 
clearly demonstrate that this was not the case. 
To calibrate the noise level we used 400 trials consisting of ten noise levels (40 
trials/noise level) that were characterized by a different percentage amount of phase 
coherence (0.1525 - .2650 in steps of .0125, where a lower percentage of phase coherence 
indicates more noise). After a short training phase, to familiarize participants with the task, 
different noise levels were presented in mini-blocks of 40 stimuli in a random order with short 
self-paced breaks in-between. The optimal noise level corresponding to an accuracy level of 
(approximately) 60% was determined with the modelfree R package for fitting psychometric 
functions (Zychaluk & Foster, 2009). 
Method: Drift-diffusion Model Analysis 
To examine the role of social influence and group size in rapid perceptual decisions, we 
estimated the mean drift rate (v), boundary separation (a), starting point (z) and nondecision 
time (Ter) using the drift- diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978). The drift-diffusion model also 
allows for between-trial variability in drift (η; normally distributed), starting point (sz; 
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uniformly distributed) and nondecision time (st; uniformly distributed). We estimated model 
parameters from the behavioral data from each participant separately, using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic as a fitting criterion (i.e., the maximal vertical distance between observed 
and predicted cumulative distribution functions of response times), as implemented in the 
fast-dm method (Voss & Voss, 2007). As in Germar et al.’s (2013) previous analyses on 
social influence, all seven model parameters were allowed to vary freely between the three 
conditions (control, small group, and large group). The parameters v, a, and z additionally 
varied as a function of cue type (i.e., the opinion cues, suggesting either face or car) to 
account for possible perceptual or judgmental bias effects. Finally, separate drift rates were 
estimated for face and car stimuli (with the lower boundary associated with car decisions and 
the upper boundary with face decisions), implying 32 parameters per participant (across all 
conditions and stimuli). 
Statistical Data Analysis 
Trials in which participants did not respond and trials with RTs < 200ms were excluded 
from all statistical analyses (4.7% of all trials). We calculated means, standard deviations and 
CI95%s for the accuracies and response times of all three conditions, separately for wrong and 
correct opinions: C, Swrong opinions, Scorrect opinions, Lwrong opinions and Lcorrect opinions. 
To test, whether group size (small and large group condition as compared to the control 
condition) had an effect on accuracy, we calculated the mean, standard deviation, CI95% and 
Cohen’s d (i.e., ߤௗ௜௙௙/ߪௗ௜௙௙ሻ (Cohen, 1988) based on the following effect measure: 
ݏ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ	݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁௚௖ ൌ 0.5 ∙ ሾ൫ܣ௚௖,௖௢ െ ܣ௖௖൯ ൅ ൫ܣ௖௖ െ ܣ௚௖,௪௢൯ሿ. (1) 
Here, Acc refers to accuracy in the control condition and Agc,co and Agc,wo refer to the 
accuracies in the group conditions (gc) with correct or wrong opinions (co, wo), respectively. 
The comparison of the response times – wrong versus correct opinions – is based on the 
following effect measure: 
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݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁	ܿ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ݊݁ݏݏ௢௖ ൌ ோ ೞ்೒,೚೎	ା	ோ்೗೒,೚೎	ଶ െ ܴ ௖ܶ௖. (2) 
ܴ ௖ܶ௖ refers to the response time in the control condition and ܴ ௦ܶ௚,௢௖	and ܴ ௟ܶ௚,௢௖  refer 
to the response times for opinion correctness (oc – correct and wrong opinions) for the small 
and large group (sg, lg), respectively. 
To see, whether ݏ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ	݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁௟௔௥௚௘	௚௥௢௨௣ > ݏ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ	݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁௦௠௔௟௟	௚௥௢௨௣ (for the accuracies) and, 
whether ݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁	ܿ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ݊݁ݏݏ௪௥௢௡௚	௢௣௜௡௜௢௡ > ݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁	ܿ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ݊݁ݏݏ௖௢௥௥௘௖௧	௢௣௜௡௜௢௡ (for the response times), 
we further calculated the mean, standard deviation, CI95% and Cohen’s d for the difference of 
these two effect measures (diff. – see Figure 2). 
For the diffusion model parameters of interest, that is v, z/a, a (and Ter) we calculated 
the means, standard deviations and CI95%. For the contrasts we again relied on Cohen’s d. 
Manipulation Checks 
At the end of the study we asked participants two questions: (1) “How realistic did you 
perceive the opinions of the group that we presented to you on the computer screen?” and (2) 
“How helpful were the opinions of the group that we presented to you on the computer 
screen?” Answers were provided on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 (not realistic/not 
helpful) to 7 (very realistic/very helpful). The results indicate that the opinions were perceived 
as realistic (M = 4.0, SD = 1.4) and helpful (M = 3.6, SD = 1.4). 
Results 
We first report the effects of group size and opinion correctness on accuracy and 
response time to show that both variables effectively influenced participants’ behavior. 
Thereafter, we provide evidence for the appropriateness of the drift-diffusion model by 
presenting a graphical display of the model's goodness-of-fit. Finally, we focus on the effects 
of group size and opinion cues on the model parameters. These results illustrate how an 
increase in group size changes the cognitive processing of categorization judgments. 
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Accuracies and Response Times 
Descriptive measures for accuracy and response time, separately for the different 
conditions (control, small group and large group) and opinion correctness (no opinion, correct 
opinion and wrong opinion), are summarized in Table 1. 
The accuracy of 59% in the control condition shows that the calibration process 
worked successfully: Even the average absolute deviation to 60% is according to Cohen’s d 
large, it is ൑10% (M = .08, SD = .06, CI95% [.06, .10], d = 1.20). Accuracy substantially 
changed when participants additionally received opinions of groups (see Figure 2A). When 
receiving correct opinions from a small group the accuracy increased by M = .13, SD = .12, 
CI95% [.09, .16] as compared to the control condition. Correct opinions of large groups (M = 
.18, SD = .12, CI95% [.14, .21]) increased accuracy even more and the comparison between 
large and small group showed a moderate-large effect of M = .05, SD = .06, CI95% [.03, .06], d 
= 0.79. Social influence also reduced the accuracy when a wrong opinion was provided. This 
negative social influence was again smaller for the small group (M = -.15, SD = .14, CI95% [-
.19, -.10]) as compared to the large group (M = -.20, SD = .15, CI95% [-.24, -.16]) with a 
moderate effect of M = .06, SD = .11, CI95% [.02, .09], d = 0.50. These results show that 
participants used the social information provided by the opinion cues and integrated it with 
their own private information to make a final judgment. Importantly, participants did not 
follow the opinion cues blindly as the accuracy is clearly >0% for wrong opinions and <100% 
for correct opinions. Although the response times for correct opinions did not differ 
substantially from response times in the control condition (see Figure 2B), response times 
were larger when participants received wrong opinions as compared to the control condition. 
Apparently, in a situation with wrong opinions the integration of private and social 
information can lead to a conflict. 
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Drift-diffusion Model Fit 
For each participant, we estimated 32 parameters with the drift-diffusion model (for the 
different conditions, stimuli, and cue types – see Method: Drift-diffusion Model Analysis for 
details). On the basis of these estimated parameter values one can predict the cumulative 
distribution functions of response times (see Figure 3), separately for all conditions (control, 
small group, and large group), opinion correctness (wrong versus correct) and stimuli (face 
and car). Figure 3 illustrates how the models’ predictions are related to the observed behavior. 
This graphical display of model fit (Voss et al., 2013) shows that the drift-diffusion model can 
qualitatively capture all important aspects of the observed data, that is, the impact of 
condition, opinion correctness, and stimuli on both accuracy and response times. To 
quantitatively examine to what extent the model captures the behavioral data, we assessed the 
models’ goodness-of-fit using the product p value from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests as fit 
index (see Voss et al., 2013; Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). Goodness-of-fit tests with 
values of p < .05 would indicate misfit, which we did not observe for any of the participants 
(average fit index M = .42; SD = .20; range: .09 – .88). 
Results: Drift-diffusion Model Analysis 
In general, the analysis of participants’ accuracies and response times clearly 
demonstrates that the cognitive process underlying the face-versus-car categorization task is 
affected by group size and opinion correctness. In particular, for accuracies the results show 
that social influence is stronger in the large as compared to the small group condition. To 
understand in more detail how these effects can be explained on a psychological level, we 
modeled the data with the drift-diffusion model. As outlined in the introduction, social 
influence could specifically affect certain parts of the psychological processing, so we focused 
our main analyses on three parameters of the model: The drift rate v, the boundary separation 
a, and the relative starting point a /z. In an explorative step, we also tested whether there is an 
effect of group size on nondecision Ter. The main findings are shown in Figure 3. Table S1 in 
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the Appendix contains a more comprehensive summary of the additional parameters, 
including the across-trial variabilities. 
Drift rate (v). 
How does an increase in group size affect information uptake? To answer this 
question, we calculated drift rates for vControl, vSmall Group and vLarge Group (see Figure 4A left). As 
the drift rate was allowed to freely vary between stimuli (i.e., was a face or a car presented?) 
and opinion cues (i.e., was the opinion of the group in favor of face or car?), vControl, vSmall Group 
and vLarge Group were derived by calculating mean estimates across stimuli and opinion cues. 
Very generally, the drift rate can be interpreted as the (relative) amount of evidence 
accumulated per time unit and increases when a stimuli becomes easier or the perceptual 
system more sensitive (e.g., Voss et al., 2004). In this experiment, a face (car) judgment is 
executed when the evidence accumulator hits the upper (lower) boundary and as a 
consequence drift toward face (car) goes along with a positive (negative) sign. In this 
particular analysis, we were interested in how an increase in group size affects the efficiency 
of evidence accumulation independent of which stimuli was presented. Therefore, we 
averaged the absolute values of the drift rates. 
The drift rate in the large group condition (M = 1.01, SD = 0.52, CI95% [0.87, 1.16]) 
was higher than in the small group condition (M = 0.83, SD = 0.40, CI95% [0.72, 0.94]) with a 
moderate effect between vLarge and vSmall Group of M = 0.18, SD = 0.40, CI95% [0.07, 0.29], d = 
0.46. Moreover, there was also a moderate effect between vSmall Group and vControl of M = 0.27, 
SD = 0.51, CI95% [0.13, 0.41], d = 0.53, which shows that the drift rate increases from the 
control condition (M = 0.56, SD = 0.37, CI95% [0.46, 0.66]) to the small group condition as 
well. These results show that participants accumulate evidence more efficiently the larger the 
group. A linear increase can be ruled out, as the increase in group size between vLarge Group and 
vSmall Group (“+18 opinions”) and vSmall Group and vControl (“+1 opinion”) is not proportional to the 
increase in drift rate. 
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If participants’ evidence accumulation process was indeed biased towards the choice 
option favored by the group, we can expect higher positive (negative) drift rates in the large as 
compared to the small group condition for face (car) opinion cues. To further examine this 
assumption, we calculated the mean drift rates vSmall Face, vSmall Car, vLarge Face and vLarge Car for 
both group sizes and opinion cues by averaging across stimuli (see Figure 4B). Here, in 
contrast to the previous analysis, we were interested in the direction of the drift, which is why 
we did not use absolute values. Not surprisingly, the mean drift rates were negative for car 
cues and positive for face cues. The drift rates for car were more negative (i.e., higher in 
absolute terms) for the large group condition (M = -0.62, SD = 0.79, CI95% [-0.84, -0.39]) than 
for the small group condition (M = -0.41, SD = 0.77, CI95% [-0.63, -0.19]) with a small effect 
of M = -0.21, SD = 0.61, CI95% [-0.38, -0.04], d = 0.34. We found a similar effect for the drift 
rates for face. Here, vLarge Face (M = 0.89, SD = 0.81, CI95% [0.66, 1.11]) was more positive 
than vSmall Face (M = 0.61, SD = 0.68, CI95% [0.42, 0.81]) with a corresponding small-moderate 
difference of M = 0.27, SD = 0.57, CI95% [0.11, 0.43], d = 0.47. The presented analyses clearly 
show that group size interacts with cue type: Participants’ evidence accumulation is biased 
toward the stimuli cued by the group and this effect is stronger for large as compared to small 
group opinions. 
Finally, we also tested whether one of the two stimuli was processed with more ease 
by the participants. This was done by comparing vFace with vCar in the control condition. Please 
note that here the indices “Face” and “Car” correspond to the observed stimuli and not, as in 
the previous analyses, to the opinions of a group. In the control condition vFace (M = 0.44, SD 
= 0.55, CI95% [0.28, 0.59]) was not higher than vCar (M = -0.19, SD = 0.75, CI95% [-0.40, 
0.02]): A within-subjects comparison of the absolute values of vFace and vCar shows that there 
is no effect (M = -0.01, SD = 0.61, CI95% [-0.18, 0.16]). 
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Starting point position (z/a). 
The relative position of the starting point between the boundaries (i.e., z divided by a), 
can be interpreted as a measure of a priori bias toward a decision alternative (e.g., Klauer & 
Voss, 2008). Values of z/a larger than 0.5 would indicate a bias toward the choice option 
associated with the upper boundary (i.e., requiring relatively less information for “upper-
boundary” decisions, i.e., faces) and values smaller than 0.5 indicate a bias toward lower-
boundary decisions (i.e., cars). The modeling suggests that participants were a priori more in 
favor of car decisions (with z/a < 0.5 in all three conditions – see Figure 4A, middle). The 
relative starting point decreased with increasing group size and was smaller in the large group 
condition (M = 0.41, SD = 0.09, CI95% [0.39, 0.44]) than in the small group condition (M = 
0.43, SD = 0.08, CI95% [0.41, 0.45]) and highest in the control condition (M = 0.45, SD = 0.06, 
CI95% [0.43, 0.47]). However, only the contrast z/aLarge Group - z/aControl shows a small-moderate 
difference (M = -0.04, SD = 0.08, CI95% [-0.06, -0.01], d = 0.43), whereas the contrasts z/aLarge 
Group - z/aSmall Group (M = -0.02, SD = 0.10, CI95% [-0.04, 0.01]) and z/aSmall Group - z/aControl (M = -
0.02, SD = 0.07, CI95% [-0.04, 0.00]) do not. This analysis shows that the general a priori bias 
toward cars gets larger with an increase in group size. However, only the difference between 
the large group and the control condition shows an effect (Figure 4A). Further, there was no 
interaction between group size and cue type (see Figure 4C). 
Boundary separation (a). 
The drift-diffusion model can map response caution with a larger boundary separation 
parameter. Increases in a lead to slower, but more accurate decisions, as an accidental 
crossing of the incorrect boundary (i.e., face when car would be correct or vice versa) due to 
noise in the evidence accumulation process becomes less likely (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2009). 
Here, an increase in group size resulted in an increase in boundary separation (averaged 
across cues). Participants were more cautious in their decisions the larger the group; that is, 
they sacrificed speed for accuracy (see Figure 4A right). The boundary separation in the large 
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group condition (M = 1.28, SD = 0.17, CI95% [1.24, 1.33]) was higher than the boundary 
separation in the small group condition (M = 1.23, SD = 0.19, CI95% [1.18, 1.28]) with a 
small-moderate effect between aLarge Group and aSmall Group of (M = 0.06, SD = 0.13, CI95% [0.02, 
0.09], d = 0.43). There was also a moderate effect of M = 0.07, SD = 0.13, CI95% [0.03, 0.10], 
d = 0.53 between aSmall Group and aControl (M = 1.16, SD = 0.16, CI95% [1.12, 1.21]). These 
results provide further evidence for the claim that participants did not just blindly follow the 
opinions of others (also see Accuracies and Response Times). 
Nondecision time (Ter). 
Although, the nondecision time (Ter) parameter is not of main interest in respect to our 
hypotheses, we nevertheless tested whether an increase in group size leads to a modulation of 
Ter. We found no effect when comparing the large group condition (M = 0.72, SD = 0.21, 
CI95% [0.66, 0.77]) with the small group condition (M = 0.72, SD = 0.21, CI95% [0.66, 0.78]) 
nor when comparing the small group condition with the control group (M = 0.73, SD = 0.22, 
CI95% [0.67, 0.79]): The differences between both Ter Large Group and Ter Small Group (M = -0.01, SD 
= 0.06, CI95% [-0.02, 0.01]) and Ter Small Group and Ter Control (M = -0.01, SD = 0.06, CI95% [-0.03, 
0.01]) were close to 0. This shows that increases in social influence due to increases in group 
size do not go along with changes in nondecision processes (e.g., motor preparation). 
Discussion 
People’s motivation to gain a more accurate perception of reality is a fundamental 
aspect of social influence and one of the prime reasons why we conform to the opinions of 
others (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Research in the field of social 
psychology (Asch, 1951, 1955; Bond, 2005; Latané, 1981; Latané & Wolf, 1981; MacCoun, 
2012; Mullen, 1983; Tanford & Penrod, 1984) and the wisdom of the crowds (Larrick et al., 
2012; Mannes, 2009; Surowiecki, 2005) has hotly debated the question of which 
mathematical model can best describe the functional relationship between group size and 
(informational) social influence. However, to the best of our knowledge, no previous study 
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has yet applied a sequential sampling model to study the psychological mechanisms that 
underlie this fundamental relationship. Here, we combined the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff, 
1978) with an adapted version of the face-versus-car categorization task (Philiastides et al., 
2011) to compare different hypotheses of how an increase in group size could lead to an 
increase in social influence. On a behavioral level, we observed that opinion correctness 
effectively influenced participants’ accuracy in the categorization task and that this effect is 
stronger in the large as compared to the small group condition. Further, we saw that response 
times increased after participants were confronted with wrong as compared to correct 
opinions, independent of group size. These results demonstrate that participants were 
influenced by both the size and the opinion of a group. The drift-diffusion model was able to 
accurately describe accuracies and response and to transform these measures into 
psychologically interpretable parameter values. Here, we can see that evidence for options 
favoured by larger groups was processed more efficiently (effect on v), but also that 
participants required more evidence (effect on a) before they made a final decision. 
Importantly, there was no difference in the relative starting point between the two group 
conditions. In sum, these results provide additional evidence for the validity of the general 
social influence mechanism proposed by Germar et al. (2013) and further show, that an 
increase in group size from one to 19 people modulates this process in a non-linear way. 
Of the two bias parameters – drift rate (“perceptual bias”) and relative starting point 
(“judgmental bias”) – only the drift rate was modulated by group size and cue type. Further, 
we also observed an interaction between these two factors, with more positive (negative) drift 
rates for face (car) cues in the large as compared to the small group condition. Generally, the 
drift rate is interpreted as the “rate of accumulation of information” (Ratcliff & McKoon, 
2008), the “speed of information uptake” (Voss et al., 2013) or the “ease of processing” 
(Wagenmakers, 2009) and it has been empirically shown that the drift rate decreases when 
stimuli become harder to discriminate (Ratcliff, 2002; Voss et al., 2004). Drift rate maps task 
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difficulty and/or perceptual sensitivity (e.g., Voss et al., 2004) and when (absolute) drift is 
high decisions are fast and less driven by noisy fluctuations (Wagenmakers, 2009). 
Apparently, in this study, evidence for a choice option favoured by a large group was 
accumulated with more ease than evidence for a choice option favoured by a small group. 
Importantly, this finding cannot alternatively be explained by a priming effect, as the words 
“face” or “car” were present on the visual cues of both conditions. It is also noteworthy to 
mention that effects on the drift rate have also been found in other studies using social 
information, e.g., in Philiastides and Ratcliff (2013), who studied the effect of branding, or in 
Klauer et al. (2007), who decomposed the psychological mechanisms of the implicit 
association test. On a neural level, Philiastides et al. (2011) were able to show that by 
disrupting the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex before participants solved the face-versus-car 
categorization task, the herewith induced decrease in accuracy and increase in response times 
go along with a decrease in drift rate. This finding points to a neural mechanism, which could 
also underlie the social influence effect. A potential next step would therefore be to use the 
adapted version of the face-versus-car categorization task presented here in combination with 
imaging techniques, such as fMRI. 
Besides the effect on the drift rate we also found an increase in boundary separation 
for large as compared to small groups. The boundary separation parameter is thought to 
represent “conservatism” or “response cautiousness” and regulates the speed versus accuracy 
trade-off, where an increase in boundary separation leads to slower, but more accurate 
decisions (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Voss et al., 2013; Wagenmakers, 2009). It has been 
shown empirically that accuracy (or speed) instructions can lead to a higher (lower) value of 
the boundary separation parameter (Ratcliff, 2002; Voss et al., 2004). An increase in 
boundary separation was also found in the social influence experiments reported by Germar et 
al. (2013). In our experiment, participants were more cautious in the large as compared to the 
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small group condition and generally more cautious in the group conditions as compared to the 
control condition, which shows that people do not just blindly follow the opinions of others.  
So how do could these two psychological mechanisms work together? In the 
instructions we explicitly statedthat group opinions can also be wrong and that it is not always 
good to follow them. Higher response times for wrong as compared to correct opinion cues 
and accuracies, which were <100% for correct advice and >0% for wrong advice, show that 
most participants followed this advice and as a consequence integrated both social (opinion 
cues) and private (noisy stimuli) sources of evidence. The boundary separation is thought to 
be under subjective control, whereas the drift rate is not (Wagenmakers, 2009). Importantly, 
when the opinion of a group is inaccurate, a higher drift rate can also lead to faster wrong 
decisions. As drift rate is most probably not consciously controllable by a person, it could be 
that participants counteracted the risk of wrong decisions by increasing the amount of 
evidence necessary to make a final decision. Interestingly, independent of opinion 
correctness, accuracy in the large group condition (M = .65, SD = .09) is almost equal to 
accuracy in the small group condition (M = .64 , SD = .09). Mannes (2009) reported that 
although people generally seem to acknowledge the wisdom of the crowds they are not 
sensitive enough to the information provided by the size of the group. We speculate that this 
could be due to too strong a scepticism toward large groups as compared to small groups, 
reflected in a (too) high boundary separation parameter for the large group. 
Finally, in our data we can observe that participants responded with “face” slightly 
more often than with “car” (in 55% of all valid trials). Although we did not find a within-
subjects difference when comparing the (absolute) drift rates for face and car in the control 
condition, the average values show that there could be a tendency to process faces a little bit 
more easily. Because we mentioned in the instructions that both stimuli will be presented 
equally often, the a priori bias toward car in all three conditions could reflect a sensible 
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strategy to counteract a tendency to “see” faces more often. An a priori bias can be found in 
studies where a response leads to greater rewards (Voss et al., 2004) or when two decision 
options are correct with an unequal probability (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Here, we find a 
general (a priori) bias toward cars and this bias is higher in the large group as compared to the 
baseline condition. Why participants increased their bias toward car in the large group 
condition, however, is not clear to us. 
In sum, the results of this study confirm the general findings of Germar et al. (2013) 
by showing that social influence primarily leads to a more efficient information uptake. 
Additionally, we can show that this mechanism is scaled by group size. Besides the drift rate, 
we also found an effect on the boundary separation. These findings extend the knowledge on 
the psychological mechanism underlying social influence and for the first time show how 
group size influences the psychological processes of interest. 
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Table 1 
Accuracy and Response Time 
  Accuracy  Response Time 
condition opinion correctness M (SD) CI95%  M (SD) CI95% 
control no opinions .59 (.10) [.56, .62]  977 (204) [920, 1035] 
small correct .72 (.12) [.68, .75]  979 (207) [920, 1037] 
wrong .44 (.17) [.39, .49]  998 (205) [940, 1055] 
large correct .76 (.13) [.73, .80]  974 (204) [917, 1031] 
wrong .39 (.18) [.34, .44]  995 (215) [935, 1056]  
 
Notes. Accuracies represent the group mean of the mean accuracies of each participant. 
Response times represent the group mean of the median response times of each participant. CI 
= confidence interval. For all within-subjects conditions we had a sample size of N = 51. 
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Figure 1. Trial structure. (1) At the beginning of each mini-block the condition (control, small 
group or large group) was indicated. (2) At the beginning of every trial, participants were 
exposed to a visual cue indicating the opinion (“face” or “car”) of the majority of a group 
consisting of 19 individuals (large group), a visual cue indicating the opinion of a single 
individual (small group) or a visually analogous cue with no further information (control). For 
the visual cue of the control condition we replaced the group opinion – “face” (“Gesicht” in 
German) or “car” (“Auto”) – with “Xxxx” and the number of persons below the opinion was 
set to 00 instead of 01 or 19. (3) Dynamic noisy visual stimuli of either faces or cars were 
presented for a maximum of 1.5s during which participants made a decision. 
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Figure 2. Effects of group size and opinion correctness on accuracy and response time: (A) 
ݏ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ	݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁௚௖ (see methods for details) for accuracy was calculated for the small (1) group 
(M = .14, SD = .11, CI95% [.10, .17], d = 1.22) and for the large (19) group condition (M = .19, 
SD = .13, CI95% [.15, .22], d = 1.48). The contrast ݏ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ	݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁௟௔௥௚௘	௚௥௢௨௣ - 
ݏ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ	݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁௦௠௔௟௟	௚௥௢௨௣ (diff.) shows a moderate-large main effect between groups on accuracy 
of M = .05, SD = .07, CI95% [.03, .07], d = 0.75. (B) The response time 
	݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁	ܿ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ݊݁ݏݏ௪௥௢௡௚	௢௣௜௡௜௢௡ (M = 19ms, SD = 59ms, CI95% [3ms, 36ms], d = 0.32) was larger 
than the ݂݈݅݊ݑ݁݊ܿ݁	ܿ݋ݎݎ݁ܿݐ݊݁ݏݏ௖௢௥௥௘௖௧	௢௣௜௡௜௢௡ (M = -1ms, 95%, SD = 63ms, CI95% [-19ms, 17ms]). 
This corresponds to a moderate main effect of opinion correctness on response times (diff.) of 
M = 20ms, SD = 38ms, CI95% [9ms, 31ms], d = .53. 
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Figure 3. Graphical displays of model fit (based on aggregated data, averaged across 
participants). The plots show the observed (dotted lines) and predicted (straight lines) 
cumulative distribution functions of response times, as function of condition (control, small 
group, and large group), opinion correctness (correct and wrong opinions), and observed 
stimulus (face or car). Error response times were multiplied by –1 and are displayed on the 
negative side of the x-axis. The point where a curve intersects with the y-axis represents the 
proportion of error responses.   
WHY DOES SOCIAL INFLUENCE INCREASE WITH GROUP SIZE 33 
 
Figure 4. The effect of group size and opinion cues on information processing. Displayed are 
the width-adjusted Cousineau-Morey CI95%s (inner-tiers) and the multilevel CI95%s (outer-
tiers) for (A) the drift rate (left), the relative starting point (middle) and the boundary 
separation (right) separately for the control, the small group and the large group condition (B) 
the drift rate and (C) the relative starting point depending on opinion cue (“car” and “face”) 
and group size (small and large). Width-adjusted Cousineau-Morey (CM) and Multilevel 
(ML) CI95%s were computed using the R functions provided by Baguely (2012). In a within-
subjects design non-overlap of the CM CI95%s (inner tiers) for two means corresponds to a 
CI95% of the difference between the two means, which doesn’t include 0. ML CI95%s (outer 
tiers) are of interest, when one wants to see, if a particular parameter value is a plausible 
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candidate for the estimated mean (e.g. is a relative starting point of .5 a plausible value in 
condition XY). 
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Appendix 
Table S1 
Additional parameters of the diffusion model 
parameter M (SD) CI95% 
zControl 0.52 (0.06) [0.50, 0.53] 
zSmall Car 0.52 (0.09) [0.49, 0.54] 
zSmall Face 0.51 (0.09) [0.49, 0.54] 
zLarge Car 0.54 (0.16) [0.49, 0.59] 
zLarge Face 0.51 (0.16) [0.46, 0.55] 
aControl 1.16 (0.16) [1.12, 1.21] 
aSmall 1.23 (0.19) [1.18, 1.28] 
aLarge 1.28 (0.17) [1.24, 1.33] 
aSmall Car 1.20 (0.20) [1.15, 1.26] 
aSmall Face 1.25 (0.19) [1.20, 1.30] 
aLarge Car 1.29 (0.21) [1.23, 1.34] 
aLarge Face 1.28 (0.20) [1.23, 1.34] 
vSmall Car Car -0.70 (0.93) [-0.96, -0.44] 
vSmall Car Face 0.25 (0.93) [-0.01, 0.51] 
vSmall Face Car -0.12 (0.87) [-0.36, 0.13] 
vSmall Face Face 0.98 (0.66) [0.80, 1.17] 
vLarge Car Car -0.99 (0.81) [-1.22, -0.77] 
vLarge Car Face 0.59 (0.97) [0.31, 0.86] 
vLarge Face Car -0.24 (0.97) [-0.51, 0.03] 
vLarge Face Face 1.19 (0.91) [0.93, 1.44] 
ηControl 0.48 (0.27) [0.41, 0.56] 
ηSmall 0.52 (0.28) [0.44, 0.59] 
ηLarge 0.58 (0.25) [0.51, 0.65] 
szControl 0.33 (0.12) [0.30, 0.36] 
szSmall 0.34 (0.10) [0.31, 0.37] 
szLarge 0.36 (0.08) [0.34, 0.39] 
stControl 0.02 (0.01) [0.01, 0.02] 
stSmall 0.02 (0.01) [0.02, 0.02] 
stLarge 0.02 (0.01) [0.01, 0.02] 
 
Notes. All values are based on a sample size of N = 51. The first index refers to group size (Control, Small and 
Large). For all parameters – except v – Car or Face refers to the opinion cue. For v the second index refers to the 
observed stimuli (Car versus Face), whereas the third index refers to the opinion cue (Car versus Face). 
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Abstract 
Informational cascades can occur when rationally acting individuals decide independently of 
their private information and follow the decisions of preceding decision makers. In the 
process of updating beliefs, differences in the weighting of private and publicly available 
social information may modulate the probability that a cascade starts in a decisive way. By 
using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined neural activity while participants 
updated their beliefs based on the decisions of two fictitious stock market traders and their 
own private information, which led to a final decision of buying one out of two stocks. 
Computational modeling of the behavioral data showed that a majority of participants 
overweighted private information. Overweighting was negatively correlated with the 
probability of starting an informational cascade in trials especially prone to conformity. Belief 
updating by private information was related to activity in the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior 
insula, the DLPFC, and the parietal cortex; the more a participant overweighted private 
information, the higher the activity in the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and the lower 
in the parietal-temporal cortex. This is the first study exploring the neural correlates of 
overweighting of private information, which underlies the tendency to start an informational 
cascade. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research in the social sciences has reliably demonstrated that individuals are influenced 
by the behavior of others (e.g., Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Raafat, Chater, and Frith, 2009). 
Stock market bubbles, for example, can emerge when traders start to follow misleading 
decisions made by their colleagues, disregarding their own private information. Interestingly, 
theoretical and empirical work in economics has shown that initial decisions of others can 
create an environment in which it is even rational for subsequent decision makers to disregard 
their own private information and to follow others. Such a pattern of conforming decisions is 
called an informational cascade (Anderson and Holt, 1997; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et 
al., 1992). Usually, informational cascades lead to a desired outcome. However, a “reverse” 
cascade can arise if a substantial number of initial decision makers receive an incorrect 
private signal and therefore make incorrect decisions. In such situations, all subsequent 
decision makers would rationally follow the initial decisions and ignore their own private 
signals. The theory of informational cascades can explain numerous real-life phenomenon, 
such as nonemployment in the labor market (Oberholzer-Gee, 2008), revolutionary regime 
transitions (Ellis and Fender, 2011), and financial crises (Chari and Kehoe, 2004). The 
probability that a cascade starts strongly depends on how people weight and integrate their 
own private as compared to publicly available social information (Bernardo and Welch, 2001; 
Goeree et al., 2007; Nöth and Weber, 2003). Weizsäcker's (2010) meta-analysis suggests that 
people tend to overweight private as compared to social information, even in situations in 
which following others is beneficial. Due to overweighting of private information, cascades 
might occur less often, as predicted by the theory of informational cascades. In the present 
work, we combine neurobiological, economic, and computational approaches to investigate 
the neural mechanism of (biased) belief updating during financial decisions and to explore 
individual differences in the weighting and processing of private information, which can 
modulate the frequency of starting a cascade. 
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From a cognitive perspective, informational cascades are based on a process of 
sequential belief updating of social and private information, on which a final decision under 
uncertainty rests. Recent studies in the field of decision neuroscience provide evidence for the 
involvement of the anterior insula (Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008), the anterior insula in 
combination with the inferior frontal gyrus (Paulus et al., 2003), the posterior fronto-median 
cortex (Volz et al., 2003, 2004) and the parietal cortex, often in combination with the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Huettel et al., 2005; Mohr et al., 2010; Stern et al., 2010; 
Symmonds et al., 2011; Vickery and Jiang, 2009; Wright et al., 2012), in belief updating and 
decision making under uncertainty (see (Bach et al., 2011) for an overview). Whereas the 
inferior parietal lobule (angular gyrus) seems to have a special role in tracking observed 
relative frequencies of events, activity within a region of the inferior frontal gyrus has been 
found to be negatively correlated with Bayesian posterior probability (d’Acremont et al., 
2013). 
Contrary to other paradigms exploring belief updating (e.g., the evidence accumulation 
task; Stern et al., 2010 or the ball/bin betting task by d’Acremont et al., 2013), informational 
cascades require people not only to update a belief on the basis of (private) information, but 
additionally to derive social information from the observed decisions of others. A better 
understanding of the differences in updating private as compared to social information is 
crucial for the theory of informational cascades, because overweighting of private information 
can result in fewer cascades than predicted by the theory. Here, for the first time, we 
investigate the neural mechanism of biased belief updating of private as compared to social 
information.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty-two people recruited from the subject pool of the University of Basel participated 
in our experiment. Five participants were excluded from the final data analysis (two because 
of technical problems during the fMRI data acquisition, one because of a technical error in the 
experimental script, one because of misuse of the response device, and one because of left-
handedness). The final sample consisted of 27 healthy, right-handed participants with normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision (mean age = 22.4 years, ± 2.0 years SD, 20-29 years, 9 
females). The study was approved by the local ethics committee and participants gave written 
informed consent. Participation in the study was reimbursed with a fixed amount of 30 CHF 
and a variable bonus (mean bonus = 3.99 CHF, ± 0.42 CHF SD, 2.90-4.60 CHF). The 
variable bonus was performance contingent, so that deviations from the correct probability 
estimate led to a lower bonus following a non-linear quadratic scoring rule (Selten, 1998). 
Experimental design 
We used a hypothetical decision scenario representing an adapted version of the 
classical informational cascades paradigm (Anderson and Holt, 1997). In our study, 
participants acting as stock market traders were required to repeatedly choose the profitable 
(“݃݋݋݀”) of two stocks (W or S) given some evidence e. Participants were told that stock 
markets are very volatile and fast moving and that every week (trial) only one stock is 
profitable. At the end of each trial, participants reported the posterior probability ݌ሺ݃݋݋݀|݁ሻ௧ 
that the chosen stock was “݃݋݋݀” (Figure 1). In the 32 experimental trials, participants 
sequentially received three different pieces of evidence. At the beginning of a trial, two 
decisions made by other fictitious traders (trader I and II) in the “Swiss Capital Bank” were 
shown, representing social information I and social information II. The social information 
was followed by private information in the form of a personal recommendation from a rating 
7 
agency. Participants were informed that all other traders also received their own personal 
recommendation from an independent rating agency. The likelihood ݌ሺ݁|݃݋݋݀ሻ௧ of receiving 
a correct recommendation from a rating agency was 2/3 (indicated by the visual cue: “+”) or 
4/5 (visual cue: “++”) for all traders and for the participant. The quality (“+” or “++”) of the 
recommendations received was indicated on the screen above the decisions of the other 
traders (social information I and II) or above the private information for the participant. The 
posterior probability that one of the two stocks was profitable (“݃݋݋݀”) given the received 
and perceived evidence can be determined following Bayes theorem as: 
݌ሺ݃݋݋݀|݁ሻݐ ൌ ݌ሺ݃݋݋݀|݁ሻݐെ1∙݌ሺ݁|݃݋݋݀ሻݐ݌ሺ݃݋݋݀|݁ሻݐെ1∙݌ሺ݁|݃݋݋݀ሻݐ൅	݌ሺܾܽ݀|݁ሻݐെ1∙݌ሺ݁|ܾܽ݀ሻݐ,  
(1)
where t refers to the three different points in time in the belief updating process (see Figure 1). 
At t = 0 without a participant having received any information ݌ሺ݃݋݋݀|݁ሻ௧ୀ଴ = 0.50. Based 
on the assumption that other traders incorporated all available evidence, participants could 
derive the recommendation received by other traders. Because trader I always received low 
(“+”) quality recommendations her decision (social information I) signaled the correct stock 
with a likelihood of 0.67 (i.e., ݌ሺ݁|݃݋݋݀ሻ = 0.67). Next, trader II was confronted with a 
recommendation of either low (“+”) quality (i.e., ݌ሺ݁|݃݋݋݀ሻ = .67) or high (“++”) quality 
(i.e., ݌ሺ݁|݃݋݋݀ሻ = .80). This evidence could then be combined with the information inferred 
from the decision of the first trader, which led to four possible posterior probabilities of the 
chosen stock by trader II (i.e., 0.50; 0.67; 0.80; 0.89). After receiving a personal 
recommendation (private information) participants could update their belief, which should 
correspond to six different posterior probabilities (i.e., 0.50; 0.67; 0.80; 0.89; 0.94; and 0.97). 
Importantly, by using all different combinations of decisions and private information (2×4×4 
= 32 trials of interest), we created a design matrix in which the different pieces of evidence 
are independent; that is, seeing one piece of evidence did not allow the prediction of the next 
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piece of evidence. To force participants to pay equal attention to social and private 
information and to update their probability estimate at every point in time (ݐ), we included six 
filler trials in the task. In these trials, subjects had to make a decision with only one (social 
information I) or two (social information I & II) pieces of evidence and no private 
information. To familiarize themselves with the task, participants completed 11 training trials 
outside of the scanner before the fMRI session. To further boost their attention, filler trials 
were overrepresented in these training trials. The randomized sequence of trials was identical 
for all subjects. Trials were separated with fixation crosses, as were the different events within 
a trial (see Figure 1). The inter-stimulus intervals (ISI) between the time windows were varied 
according to a left truncated Poisson distribution (mean (λ) = 3172.78 ms, min = 1000 ms, 
max = 8000 ms). Importantly, from a normative Bayesian perspective, the first two decision 
makers can create a situation in which the third decision maker (and all subsequent decision 
makers) should ignore private information and just follow the decisions of others. Thus, the 
decision of the third decision maker is crucial, as it can start or prematurely end an 
informational cascade. Therefore, in our paradigm we investigated the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms underlying the process of belief updating and decision making of the third 
decision maker, who can initiate or end an informational cascade. 
Behavioral data analysis 
To examine whether participants differentiated between the six different posterior 
probabilities (i.e., ݌ሺ݃݋݋݀|݁ሻ௧ୀଷ = 0.50, 0.67, 0.80, 0.89, 0.94, and 0.97), we performed a 
one-way repeated measures ANOVA with the six levels of uncertainty as within-subject 
factor and the average probability judgments as the dependent variable. The same analysis 
was conducted with the logarithm of the reaction times as dependent measure. 
   
9 
Conformity index 
The experimental design matrix included six “conflicting” trials in which the two pieces 
of social information suggested buying the same stock whereas the private information 
suggested buying the other stock and where the normatively correct decision was consistent 
with the social information and opposite to the private information. Therefore, we calculated 
a conformity index for every participant, defined as the percentage of decisions in line with 
the decision of the others in these specific trials. 
Computational models 
To explain the cognitive process underlying belief updating, we constructed an 
Evidence Model that represents a modification of the model proposed by Hung and Plott 
(2001). According to the normative Bayesian solution (see Equation 1), a participant is 
required to update her prior belief with every new piece of evidence	݁t presented at t. To 
simplify the Bayesian solution, Equation 1 can be transformed by computing the log odds 
ratio of the posterior probabilities of which of the two stocks being the profitable one 
(“݃݋݋݀”) assuming equal priors (e.g., Dieckmann and Rieskamp, 2007); that is, 
݈݊ ௣ሺ௚௢௢ௗೈ|௘೟ሻ௣ሺ௚௢௢ௗೄ|௘೟ሻ ൌ 	∑ ݈݊
௣ሺ௘೟|௚௢௢ௗೈሻ
௣ሺ௘೟|௚௢௢ௗೄሻ௧்ୀଵ         (2) 
However, people might not follow the Bayesian solution and might weight their private 
information more heavily than the socially inferred information. To identify how people 
weight the different pieces of information, we extended Equation 2 by allowing pieces of 
information to be weighted differently; that is, 
෡ܻ ൌ ߚ0 ൅ ∑ ߚݐ ∙ ݈݊ ݌ሺ݁ݐ|݃݋݋ܹ݀ሻ݌ሺ݁ݐ|݃݋݋݀ܵሻܶݐൌ1         (3) 
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where ߚ0 represents a bias for one of the two stocks at t = 0 and ߚݐ refers to the weight given 
to the different pieces of information. If all weights are equal to 1 and ߚ0 = 0 then Equation 3 
is identical to Equation 2; that is, the normative solution is nested within the Evidence Model 
specified by Equation 3. 
When estimating the Evidence Model (see supplementary methods), we also imposed 
three different constraints on the model parameters. First, in the full model (FM) we estimated 
one bias parameter ߚ0 and three different ߚݐ weights for each piece of information at the three 
points in time (social information I, social information II, and private information), providing 
four parameters. Second, for the social model (SM), we assumed no bias (i.e., ߚ0 = 0) and one 
single weight for social information (i.e., ߚݐൌ1 = ߚݐൌ2) and one weight for private information 
(i.e., ߚݐൌ3), leading to a total of two free parameters. Third, we also determined the goodness-
of-fit of the normative Bayesian model (BM) by setting ߚ0 = 0 and all other weights to one 
(i.e., ߚݐ = 1). Whereas the BM has no flexibility in weighting information differently, the FM 
allows weighting each piece of information in a different way. The SM assumes that people 
do not have a bias for one of the options, treat both pieces of social information equally but 
weight their private information differently. The SM is more complex than the BM but less 
complex than the FM. 
Information weighting index 
A decision maker following Bayesian principles should weight the social and private 
information equally. To examine to what extent participants deviated from the Bayesian 
approach, we determined an information weighting index for the SM by dividing the 
estimated weight for the private information (ߚݐൌ3, i.e., using the mode of the marginal 
posterior distribution as a point estimate) by the sum of the estimated weights for the private 
and social information (i.e., ߚݐൌ3 + ߚݐൌ1൅2). An information weighting index > 0.50 indicates 
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overweighting of private as compared to social information, whereas values of < 0.50 indicate 
overweighting of social as compared to private information. 
Functional imaging data analyses 
To study the neural underpinnings of belief updating with social and private 
information, two first level models were calculated in the context of a GLM (SPM8, 
Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, University College London). Our experimental 
design is characterized by three updating stages (see Figure 1). In every trial, participants 
were forced to update their belief ݌ሺ݃݋݋݀|݁ሻݐ after the decisions of two traders (social 
information I & II) and after they had received their own private information. 
We computed how much a signal given at t = 2 increased/decreased the belief in the 
option that was more probable at stage t = 1 following the Bayesian solution (i.e., Equation 1). 
Likewise, we determined the difference of the posterior probability between t = 2 and t = 3. 
Please note that as the decision of trader 1 was always based on a low (+) quality signal for 
either stock W or S. Belief updating from t = 0 (i.e., the beginning of a trial) to t = 1 was the 
same for every trial and therefore not explicitly modeled. 
First level analysis 
In the first level model 1, belief updating at the social information II (belief updating by 
social information) and at the private information (belief updating by private information) 
stages was modeled with a single parametric regressor to account for general effects of belief 
updating at both stages (i.e., independent of the social or private nature of the information). 
Brain activity at the time of the decision and at the time of the probability judgment was 
modeled with separate parametric regressors tracking the log odds of the probability 
judgments and the decision for either stock W or S. We also included parametric regressors 
coding for the stock with the highest posterior probability (at t = 1 and t = 2 and 3 combined) 
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and for the quality of the private information (low (+) or high (++)) at t = 2 and 3 combined. 
Decision and/or probability judgment time windows in which participants gave no answer and 
filler stimuli were included in the GLM as regressors of no interest. 
In the first level model 2, the second (social information II) and third (private information) 
belief updating stages were modeled separately using parametric regressors to account for the 
specific effects of belief updating by social and private information. The quality of the private 
information (low (+) or high (++)) was included as a parametric regressor for the belief 
updating stage at t = 3. In all other respects, first level models 1 and 2 were similar. To 
account for head movements, both first level models included motion parameters. 
Second level analysis 
To test for the general (first level model 1) and specific (first level model 2) effects of 
belief updating as well as for the effects of an increase in subjective uncertainty during 
decision making (first level model 2 – see supplementary fMRI results) we used one-sample t-
tests on the group level (P < 0.001 (uncorrected) with a minimum cluster size of 20 voxels). 
To test how belief updating by private information was modulated by inter-individual 
differences in information weighting, we used a multiple regression design (P < 0.001 or 
0.005; uncorrected) with the information weighting index as a covariate. In order to restrict 
the search volume only to brain regions involved in belief updating by private information we 
used the results of the respective second level analysis as an explicit mask (using a liberal 
threshold, P < 0.005, uncorrected, for the mask). To further illustrate these findings we 
extracted the contrast estimates within two ROIs (see Figure 5) and plotted them against the 
information weighting index. The ROIs were defined with the MarsBaR toolbox for SPM 
(Brett et al., 2002). 
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RESULTS 
Behavioral results 
Overall, participants performed the task consistent with the Bayesian solution: In 
93.18% of all trials in which participants (N = 27) made a decision, they decided in 
accordance with the Bayesian solution, with seven participants always choosing the more 
profitable stock. The six different levels of uncertainty significantly modulated participants’ 
probability judgments, F(3.64, 94.51 = 70.28, P < 0.001 (see Figure 2 for details), with the 
probability judgments as dependent variable and the six levels of uncertainty as independent 
variable. The reaction times did not differ significantly between the six levels of uncertainty, 
F(2.59, 67.44) = 1.57, P = 0.21. 
Model comparison and parameter estimation 
To further explore how participants weighted the different types of information in belief 
updating, we compared the three different models described above according to their DIC 
values (see supplementary methods for details on model estimation and model comparison). 
The SM, which assumes a differential weighting of social as compared to private information, 
performed best (∆DICFM	minus	SM = 10.4; ∆DICBM	minus	SM = 1590.4). This result was further 
supported by an analysis at the individual level: The Bayes factors favored the SM as 
compared to the FM for 24 of all 27 participants. 
Figure 3 illustrates the difference in weighting of social and private information (SM) in 
belief updating. The weights given to social information (ܯsocial - Figure 3A, left) were 
credibly smaller than the weights given to private information (ܯprivate - Figure 3A, right). 
This is further illustrated by the contrast ܯprivate - ܯsocial (Figure 3B). Thus, during belief 
updating, participants substantially overweighted private as compared to social information. 
We also calculated the information weighting index on the basis of the estimated parameters 
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of the SM for each participant. The information weighting index (Figure 3C) was significantly 
negatively correlated with the conformity index, Pearson’s product moment correlation r(25) 
= -.83, P < 0.001, suggesting that the more people overweighted private as compared to social 
information, the less often they started a cascade in the trials of interest. 
fMRI results 
To investigate the neural processing of social and private information increasing 
uncertainty, we analyzed neural activity associated with belief updating. 
General effects of belief updating 
To correctly estimate the probability of choosing the better stock, a participant had to 
update her (prior) belief with every piece of information received (social information I & II 
and private information). Therefore, for the initial analysis we used a single parametric 
regressor that tracked the belief updating process independent of the social or private nature 
of the information (at ݐ = 2 and 3 combined). Besides others, we found significant activity in 
fronto-parietal brain regions and in the precuneus during belief updating; that is, the activity 
of these regions increased with an increase in uncertainty (see Table 1, Figure 4 for further 
details). 
Specific effects of belief updating by social or private information 
Because our behavioral results indicated a differential processing of private and social 
information, we analyzed the two main belief updating stages (social information II and 
private information) independently. The left middle temporal gyrus/inferior parietal lobule 
was active during belief updating when subjects processed social information II (see Table 1) 
whereas activity of the anterior insula, the DLPFC, and the parietal cortex, besides others (see 
Table 1 and Figure 5), correlated with belief updating by private information. 
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Modulation of belief updating by individual differences in overweighting private 
information 
The probability of an informational cascade starting depends on the differential 
weighting of private and social information. Therefore, we used the information weighting 
index to analyze how the process of belief updating (at ݐ = 3) is modulated by inter-individual 
differences in information weighting. The regression analysis showed a positive correlation of 
the belief updating activity in the inferior frontal gyrus with the information weighting index: 
A similar positive correlation was observed in the anterior insula using a more liberal 
threshold (P < 0.005). Overall, the more participants overweighted private as compared to 
social information, the more active the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula were during belief 
updating of private information (Figure 5A and Table 2). An opposite effect was found in the 
parietal-temporal cortex: The more participants overweighted private as compared to social 
information, the less active the parietal-temporal cortex was during belief updating of private 
information (Figure 5B and Table 2). 
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DISCUSSION 
By combining neurobiological, economic, and computational approaches, we were able 
to show that people who tend to overweight private as compared to social information show a 
decreased activity in the parietal-temporal cortex and an increased activity in the inferior 
frontal gyrus/anterior insula while updating their beliefs by private information. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to illuminate the neural underpinnings of biased belief 
updating by private information – the cognitive process that is decisive for the emergence and 
stability of informational cascades. 
Making an optimal decision when observing other people’s decisions and receiving 
personal (private) information as represented by the informational cascades paradigm requires 
the integration of available social and private information as described by the Bayesian 
solution. Deviations from the Bayesian solution (e.g. overweighting of private information) 
can influence subsequent decisions and therefore the occurrence of informational cascades. It 
is especially important for the theory of informational cascades to understand how the neural 
process of belief updating (of private information) is modulated by such deviations. The 
computational analysis of the behavioral data showed that subjects weighted private and 
social information differently: The majority of subjects (24 of 27 participants) overweighted 
private as compared to social information. This finding is consistent with recent research on 
informational cascades: A comprehensive meta-analysis by Weizsäcker (2010) showed that 
decision makers often overweight private information even in situations in which it would be 
optimal to follow others. The results of our behavioral control study (see supplementary 
results) indicate that subjects specifically overweight private information, which cannot 
alternatively be explained by an order-effect of overweighting recent information. 
Importantly, previous studies have shown that overweighting of private information strongly 
influences the emergence and stability of informational cascades (Bernardo and Welch, 2001; 
Nöth and Weber, 2003; Goeree et al., 2007). We also found a strong negative correlation 
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between the individual tendency to make conforming decisions (conformity index) and 
overweighting of private information (information weighting index). This clearly indicates 
that overweighting of private information lowers the tendency to follow others and thereby 
lowers the probability that an informational cascade starts or continues. 
Our fMRI results showed that an increase in uncertainty during belief updating by either 
social or private information activated the parietal-temporal cortex – a region of the brain 
previously associated with number processing (Dehaene et al., 1998, 2003). Additionally, we 
found that an increase in uncertainty during belief updating by private information activated 
the DMPFC, bilateral anterior insula, and DLPFC – brain regions closely linked to decision 
risk (for a review, see Mohr et al., 2010). Furthermore, we demonstrated that stronger 
individual overweighting of private information positively correlated with activity in the 
inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and negatively with activity in the parietal-temporal 
cortex. 
It has been shown that the inferior frontal gyrus is often co-active with the anterior 
insula (Paulus et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2012) and may constitute the so called “fronto-
insular junction” (Craig, 2009). In the decision making under risk literature, activity of the 
inferior frontal gyrus has been related to higher risk aversion (Christopoulos et al., 2009), an 
increase in positive skewness (the chance of a better than average outcome is small) 
(Symmonds et al., 2011), an increase in the variance of an outcome (uncertainty) for risk-
seeking individuals (Tobler et al., 2007), ambiguous versus non-ambiguous gambles, 
especially for ambiguity averse individuals (Bach et al., 2011), and increasing uncertainty 
(Huettel et al., 2005). Interestingly, a more posterior region within the inferior frontal gyrus 
was recently found to be more active the more improbable an event becomes as the result of a 
Bayesian updating process (d’Acremont et al., 2013). Tracking of Bayesian posterior 
probabilities, however, has to be differentiated from belief updating of uncertainty as these are 
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two different processes based on two different, but related, concepts (probability of 
occurrence with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 as compared to uncertainty with 0.5 ≤ p ≤ 1). How belief updating 
leads to adjusted representations of posterior probabilities (i.e. the outcome of the belief 
updating process) is not yet known. 
Activity in the anterior insula has been linked to risk anticipation (Mohr et al., 2010; 
Preuschoff et al., 2006), prediction of risk (Preuschoff et al., 2008), risk-aversion mistakes 
(Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005), intolerance of uncertainty (Simmons et al., 2008), risk during 
the selection of the potential behavioral responses (Huettel, 2006), and to the integration of 
subjective risk preference (Symmonds et al., 2011). Activity of the insular cortex has also 
been associated with the degree of harm avoidance (Paulus et al., 2003) and choice strategies 
that try to minimize losses (Venkatraman et al., 2009). Thus, we can speculate that the 
stronger uncertainty-related activity of the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula during the 
processing of private information conflicting with social information can overcome the 
effects of social conformity in subjective estimates of uncertainty. 
However, according to the computational model (SM) overweighting of private 
information changes the posterior probability and thereby uncertainty. Thus, increased 
uncertainty could potentially explain increased activation of the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior 
insula in participants who strongly overweighted private information. To examine this 
explanation we determined whether overweighting of private information indeed increased 
uncertainty. The (un-)certainty measured as the average absolute difference between the 
posterior probability and a pure chance prediction of 0.5 across all trials was nearly the same 
for the SM with 0.2627 and the standard model (BM) with 0.2602. Therefore, overweighting 
of private information did not on average increase uncertainty and can be ruled out as an 
explanation for the increased activity of the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula. Instead, it 
appears plausible that people who are very sensitive to cues associated with uncertainty as 
reflected in increased activity of the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula tend to overweight 
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private information. Overall, our results further support the important role of the anterior 
insula in the neural mechanism of social influence on human behavior (Berns et al., 2010; 
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma and Adolphs, 2013; Klucharev et al., 2009). 
The parietal-temporal cortex was active at all stages of belief updating (by social and 
private information). Importantly, activity of the parietal-temporal cortex was modulated by 
inter-individual differences in the weighting of private information: Stronger overweighting 
of private information was associated with decreased activity in the parietal-temporal cortex 
during the final stage of belief updating. Previous human and non-human studies consistently 
associated the parietal cortices with number processing (Dehaene et al., 1998, 2003) and with 
the resolution of uncertainty in tasks with limited knowledge about the correct action to take 
(Huettel et al., 2005, 2006; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Symmonds et al., 2011; Volz et al., 
2003, 2004). Our results suggest that people with stronger numerical processing of private 
information in the parietal cortices are less biased towards private information and estimate 
uncertainty closer to the Bayesian optimal solution; however, this makes them more prone to 
start an informational cascade. Overall, we suggest a two-fold neural mechanism of 
overweighting of private information in informational cascades: (1) increased activity of the 
inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and (2) decreased activity in the parietal-temporal cortex. 
At a later stage during decision making, these two neural signals could be integrated via the 
direct anatomical connection between insula and posterior parietal cortex (Cavada and 
Goldman-Rakic, 1989). Further experiments are needed to explore this hypothesis. 
We found a large overlap of activations evoked by increased uncertainty during belief 
updating by private information and during decision making (see supplementary fMRI 
results). In both time windows, we observed uncertainty-related activity of the DMPFC, 
anterior insula, parietal cortex and DLPFC. A meta-analysis by Mohr et al. (2010) showed 
that these brain regions are more strongly activated for decision risk as compared to 
anticipation risk. In our task, all relevant information was already available after the 
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presentation of private information. Therefore, participants had the opportunity to form a 
decision (i.e., select a stock) before the response cue. Thus, in our task it is difficult to 
differentiate the neural effects related to belief updating and decision making at the last stages 
of a trial. Interestingly, in contrast to Stern et al. (2010), we did not find activity in the 
anterior cingulate cortex during belief updating (even when using a very low uncorrected 
threshold of 0.05). This discrepancy could be caused by the differences in the statistical 
analysis and/or design of the two studies. In contrast to our study, participants in the evidence 
accumulation task used by Stern et al. (2010) (1) rated uncertainty after each of the 
information cues, (2) received only private information, (3) received a feedback after every 
trial, and (4) had the opportunity to decline a decision. Thus, further studies are needed to 
clarify the exact role of the anterior cingulate cortex in belief updating. Additional studies will 
also help to generalize the observed mechanisms to different social environments. 
Taken together, we show that private information conflicting with social information 
activates brain regions associated with risk and uncertainty. Furthermore, activity of the 
inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and the parietal-temporal cortex were modulated by inter-
individual differences in the overweighting of private information. The behavioral results 
indicate that such inter-individual differences can influence the probability that a cascade 
starts. By and large, our results suggest a profound role of the uncertainty-related neural 
activity in the formation of informational cascades. 
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Figure 1. Informational cascades task trial structure. The decisions of trader 1 (social 
information I) and trader 2 (social information II) were followed by a buying recommendation 
of a rating agency for one or the other stock (private information). At the end of every trial 
participants decided which stock (W or S) provided the higher revenue and indicated the 
probability of the correct outcome (probability judgment). The different windows were 
separated with fixation crosses (see “experimental design” section for details). 
 
Figure 2. The effect of the different levels of uncertainty signaled by social and private 
information on participants’ probability judgments. An increase in objective certainty (x-axis) 
led to increased probability judgments (y-axis). 
Note: the dotted line indicates the prediction of the normative Bayesian model (cf. Equation ). The boxes range 
from the lower quartile to the upper quartile of the distribution. The black band in the middle of the box 
represents the median. The whiskers represent the minimum and the maximum of the distribution as long as 
these estimates are not further away from the median than ±1.5×IQR. Circles represent outliers. 
 
Figure 3. Different weighting of social and private information (SM). (A) Marginal posterior 
distributions for the weight of the social information (ܯsocial) and for the weight of the private 
information (ܯprivate). (B) The contrast private information minus social information (ܯprivate 
- ܯsocial) indicates a strong difference of weighting of social and private information. (C) The 
distribution of the information weighting index shows that the majority of subjects overweight 
private as compared to social information. 
Note: The 95% Highest Density Interval (95% HDI) spans 95% of the distribution. The vertical red line indicates 
hypothetical unbiased information weighting (i.e., equal weighting of social and private information). 
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Figure 4. Neural correlates of belief updating by social and private information. Neural 
activity of the frontal and parietal cortices increased with increasing uncertainty of the 
decision. 
Note: P < 0.001; cluster size = 20, uncorrected. 
 
Figure 5. Inter-individual differences in belief updating by private information. Blue color 
indicates brain regions whose activity increased with increasing uncertainty during belief 
updating by private information. Results of the regression analysis (red boxes) represent 
activity of the subregions within the inferior frontal gyrus (A) and the parietal-temporal cortex 
(B) that was significantly correlated with overweighting of private information (information 
weighting index): The green color indicates a positive correlation, whereas the red color 
indicates a negative correlation. The two scatterplots display the average contrast estimates 
per subject within the respective cluster plotted against the information weighting index. The 
dashed red line displays a linear regression model. 
Note: P < 0.001; cluster size = 0, uncorrected; brain regions in blue color – P < 0.005; cluster size = 0, 
uncorrected (explicit mask). Clusters are overlayed on a chi2better.nii.gz template provided by MRIcron 
(http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/).   
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Table 1. Neural correlates of belief updating 
Contrast 
 MNI centroid  
Region x y z No. of voxel Z value 
General effects of belief 
updating (independent of 
social and private 
information)  
Superior Temporal Gyrus/Inferior Parietal Cortex 63 -49 19 221 4.83 
Precuneus/Posterior Cingulate 3 -61 34 222 4.79 
Superior/Middle Frontal Gyrus (DLPFC) -15 29 52 104 4.77 
Superior Temporal Gyrus/Inferior Parietal Cortex -42 -61 28 229 4.54 
Superior/Middle Frontal Gyrus 21 26 46 59 3.99 
Superior/Medial Frontal Gyrus -18 53 19 35 3.87 
Belief updating by social 
information  
Middle Temporal Gyrus -42 -58 22 28 3.79 
Belief updating by private 
information 
Superior/Middle Frontal Gyrus (DLPFC)/DMPFC 48 32 19 1807 5.84 
Precuneus/Posterior Cingulate 6 -58 40 309 5.69 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus/Anterior Insula 48 41 -14 205 5.36 
Inferior Parietal Lobe 33 -64 40 524 4.83 
Inferior Parietal Lobe -48 -64 43 372 4.52 
Middle Occipital Gyrus 27 -88 -5 145 4.45 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 42 -52 -11 161 4.41 
Cerebellum -33 -73 -38 298 4.24 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus/Anterior Insula -33 20 -2 108 4.17 
Middle/Inferior Frontal Gyrus -39 41 -8 49 4.13 
Middle Occipital Gyrus -36 -64 -11 120 4.07 
Parahippocampal Gyrus 21 -28 -11 20 3.95 
 Dorsal Striatum 12 14 7 20 3.85 
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Table 2. Neural correlates of inter-individual differences in overweighting private 
information 
Contrast 
 MNI centroid   
Region x y z No. of voxel  Z value 
Positive correlation with 
Information Weighting Index  
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 38 10 3 (11) 3.35 
Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus/Anterior Insula 
39 17 -5 (3) (2.90) 
Negative correlation with 
Information Weighting Index 
Middle Temporal Gyrus -51 -64 22 8 (36) 3.46 
 Midbrain -3 -10 -11 1 (3) 3.45 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus -54 2 -23 1 (8) 3.38 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus -48 11 -29 1 3.35 
 Midbrain -6 -13 -8 1 3.24 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus -63 -31 -8 1 (20) 3.13 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus -51 2 -29 1 3.11 
 Precuneus -3 -52 40 1 (14) 3.11 
 Middle Temporal Gyrus -57 -31 -11 1 3.10 
 Cerebellum -33 -85 -38 (8) (3.01) 
 Middle Frontal Gyrus -39 17 52 (3) (2.86) 
 Cerebellum -15 -88 -38 (3) (2.81) 
 Medial Frontal Gyrus -6 50 46 (1) (2.64) 
 Cerebellum -18 -82 -29 (1) (2.63) 
Note: Z values in brackets are significant at P < 0.005 (uncorrected), whereas Z values without brackets 
represent results significant at P < 0.001 (uncorrected). The same logic is applied for the no. of voxels. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 
Neural Underpinnings of Informational Cascades: Brain Mechanisms of Social Influence On 
Belief Updating 
Rafael E. Huber, Vasily Klucharev, and Jörg Rieskamp 
 
I. Supplementary methods - Model estimation 
To estimate the free parameters of the three computational models, we applied a 
Bayesian hierarchical approach (Kruschke, 2011) implemented with the OpenBugs software 
(Lunn et al., 2009) and the BRugs package (Thomas et al., 2006) in R (R Development Core 
Team, 2011). All three models provide a point estimate for the posterior probability that one 
stock is better than the other stock. To compare the model predictions ෠ܻ (see Equation 3) with 
the observed probability judgments of the participants, we first transformed the observed 
probabilities using a logit transformation. We then assumed a normal distributed error (ߪ௡) 
around ෠ܻ for each participant n as an additional free parameter. The model parameters for the 
݊௧௛ participant (ߚ଴௡, ߚ௧௡ and ߪ௡) were sampled from group distributions, whereas the 
parameters of these group distributions were sampled from higher order distributions. In our 
hierarchical model, explicit prior assumptions were specified at the top of the hierarchical 
model only, as all the downstream parameters were connected to the overarching values. The 
model parameters of interest for the ݊௧௛ individual (that is,	ߚ௧௡ and 	ߚ଴௡) were sampled from 
normal (group) distributions with means ܯ௧ and ܯ଴ and precisions ௧ܶ and ଴ܶ (where SD = 
1/√ܶ). The means ܯ௧ and ܯ଴ were sampled from normal hyperparameter distributions with a 
prior mean of μ௧ = 1 and a precision ߬௧ = 0.01 for all ܯ௧ and μ଴ = 0 and ߬଴ = 0.01 for ܯ଴ 
(notice that the chosen prior means μ௧ and μ଴	represent the normative solution). The 
precisions ௧ܶ and ଴ܶ were sampled from gamma distributions with Shape = 0.1 and Rate = 
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0.1. As prior distribution for the error component ߪ௡ we defined a gamma distribution with 
parameters S and R, which were also sampled from hyperparameter distributions (see 
Kruschke (2011, p.443) for a detailed description). For an efficient estimation process, we 
used a thinning factor of 100 and an initial burn-in of 10,000. All final Markov chains had a 
length of 100,000. 
Model comparison 
To compare the models we estimated the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) for all 
three computational models. The DIC is especially suited to hierarchical models, as it takes 
the goodness-of-fit and the effective number of free parameters into account. The model with 
the lowest DIC should predict a replicate data set best (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). 
Additionally, we compared the FM with the SM on the individual level via approximate 
Bayes factors based on the best fitting parameters (modes of the marginal posterior 
distributions) using the Bayesian Information Criterion (see Raftery, 1995; Wagenmakers, 
2007). 
Functional imaging data acquisition 
Functional MRI was performed with ascending slice acquisition using a T2*-weighted 
echo-planar imaging sequence using a 3T Siemens Magnetom Verio whole-body MR unit 
equipped with a 12-channel head coil; 40 axial slices; volume repetition time (TR), 2.28 s; 
echo time (TE), 30 ms; 80° flip angle; slice thickness, 3.0 mm; field of view (FoV) read, 228 
mm; slice matrix 76×76. For structural MRI, we acquired a T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence 
(176 sagittal slices; volume TR, 2.0 s; TE, 3.37 ms; 8° flip angle; slice matrix 256×256; slice 
thickness, 1.0 mm; no gap; FoV, 256 mm). We preprocessed the fMRI data using SPM8 
(Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, University College London). We applied a slice 
time correction using the middle image as reference. Preprocessing was continued with spatial 
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realignment to correct for head movement. T1 images were then co-registered to the mean 
functional image created in the previous step. This image was segmented into grey matter, 
white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). In a next step, the data were normalized 
according to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template and smoothed with a 
Gaussian smoothing kernel (FWHM = 8 mm). The start of the experimental paradigm was 
triggered by the 7th scanner pulse to account for magnetization equilibration and previous 
scans were excluded from the final analysis. 
II. Supplementary behavioural results - Control Study 
The standard informational cascades paradigm implies a fixed order of social followed 
by private information. However, due to the fixed order of the presented information, it could 
have been that a different weight assigned to the private information simply represented an 
order effect in which the last piece of information is given larger weight (e.g., Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992). Therefore, in order to examine whether indeed the last piece of information 
was given larger weight, we conducted a control study in which we had an additional 
condition in which only private information was presented. Seventeen participants (mean age 
= 21.6 years, ± 1.7 SD, 20-25 years, 6 females) participated in this additional behavioral study 
that consisted of 60 trials with 8 filler trials, 26 standard trials (social information I, social 
information II and private information; similar to the fMRI study) and 26 control trials 
(private information I, private information II and private information III). To explore a 
potential order effect, we compared the standard and control trials with each other by 
estimating the SM model. This enabled us to examine whether private information is 
weighted differently as compared to social information or whether simply the last piece of 
information is given larger weight than the preceding information. 
The analysis of the standard trials replicated the behavioral results of the fMRI study: 
A clear trend towards overweighting of private information was observed, ܯ௣௥௜௩௔௧௘ - ܯ௦௢௖௜௔௟, 
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mode = 0.165, 95% HDI = -0.0316 – 0.394. Importantly, the analysis of the control trials 
(consisting of private information only) did not show overweighting of the last private 
information at the end of the trial: The marginal posterior for ܯ௣௥௜௩௔௧௘	ூூூ (private information 
III; mode = 0.748, 95% HDI = 0.615-0.873) could not be credibly differentiated from the 
marginal posterior for ܯ௣௥௜௩௔௧௘	ூାூூ (private information I & II, mode = 0.746, 95% HDI of 
0.609-0.876), as indicated by the 95% HDI for the contrast ܯ௣௥௜௩௔௧௘	ூூூ - ܯ௣௥௜௩௔௧௘	ூାூூ, mode = 
-0.005, 95% HDI = -0.189-0.18. The results of the control study, in particular the control 
condition, showed that the last piece of information is not overweighted due to a recency 
effect and no order effect was observed. Thus, we can conclude that the larger weight given to 
private information as compared to social information in the fMRI study was due to the 
private versus social character of the information. 
III. Supplementary fMRI results - The effect of subjective uncertainty during decision 
making 
The probability judgments (i.e. subjective posterior probabilities) provided by the 
participants are a very direct measure of subjective uncertainty. Additionally, we analyzed the 
effect of subjective uncertainty on brain activity during decision making (decision time-
window). At the end of each trial, participants made a probability judgment about their 
decision. We found that increased subjective uncertainty activated the bilateral fronto-parietal 
network, the left fronto-insular cortex and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) (Fig. 
S1 and Table S1). Thus, the brain areas involved into the belief updating by private 
information were also engaged into the final decision-making process. 
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Figure S1. Neural correlates of subjective uncertainty during decision making. The decision-
related activity of the anterior insular, parietal and frontal cortices increased with increasing 
subjective uncertainty.  
Note:  p < 0.001, cluster size = 20, uncorrected. Subjects indicated the subjective uncertainty of the decision at 
the end of each trial (probability judgment phase). 
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Table S1. Neural correlates of subjective uncertainty during decision making 
 MNI centroid  
Region x y z No. of Voxel  Z value 
Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (DMPFC) 
 
12 23 37 1368 4.74 
Cerebellum 
 
33 -61 -29 279 4.72 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus / Precentral Gyrus 
 
-48 41 1 644 4.65 
Cerebellum 
 
-27 -58 -32 647 4.51 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 57 -40 1 110 4.31 
Inferior Parietal Lobule 51 -46 22 146 4.24 
Superior Temporal Gyrus -54 -49 19 77 4.13 
Superior Frontal Gyrus -18 56 31 41 4.00 
Thalamus 9 -13 13 24 3.89 
Precuneus 3 -58 43 32 3.68 
Inferior Parietal Lobule -42 -52 43 76 3.63 
 
Running head: SOCIAL INFLUENCES IN SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING  1 
 
 
 
 
Social Influences in Sequential Decision Making 
Markus Schöbel, Jörg Rieskamp, and Rafael E. Huber 
University of Basel, Department of Psychology, Basel, Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Note 
This work was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF grant no. 100014-
130352) to Jörg Rieskamp. Address all correspondence to: Markus Schöbel, Center for 
Economic Psychology, Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Missionsstrasse 62a, 
4055 Basel, Switzerland, Phone: +41 (0)61 267 05 86, Fax: +41 (0)61 267 06 13, e-mail: 
m.schoebel@unibas.ch. 
  
SOCIAL INFLUENCES IN SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING  2 
Abstract 
The present work examines social influence on people’s decisions in a sequential 
decision-making situation. The first experimental study using an information cascade 
paradigm shows that people infer information from others’ decisions for making their own 
decisions. Following a cognitive modeling approach, our proposed social influence model 
shows that people overweight their own private information relative to the inferred social 
information. The second study examines the decision problem of Study 1 embedded in a 
medical decision-making problem. We test whether in the medical situation people do not 
only infer information from other’s decision but also take other’s authority into account. The 
social influence model illustrates an authority effect such that people overweight public 
information inferred from higher ranked persons as compared to equally ranked persons. Both 
studies shows how the social environment provides different sources of information that 
people integrate for making decisions.  
Keywords: Social Influence, Conformity, Authority, Informational Social Influence,  
Information Cascade, Bayesian Analysis 
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Social Influences in Sequential Decision Making 
Individuals often ignore their own opinion in favor of the opinions of others. Early 
experimental results of Asch (1951, 1956) and Sherif (1935) impressively illustrated how the 
judgments of others influence individuals’ judgments. People sometimes follow the behavior 
of others even when they provide inaccurate information. The present article focuses on a 
decision-making problem in which several individuals sequentially make decisions and have 
the potential to influence each other. This situation has been studied by economists (e.g., 
Anderson & Holt, 1997; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992) who focused on 
conformity behavior due to the cognitive integration of socially inferred information 
improving individual decisions. In contrast, social psychologists have additionally 
emphasized conformity behavior, which is motivated by maintaining or building acceptance 
and belonging. Following a cognitive modeling approach, the goal of the present study is to 
examine to what extent individual decisions are affected by different types of social influence. 
Specifically, we are interested in how socially inferred information and normative 
expectations of an authority have an impact on individual decisions. 
Imagine a physician confronted with the task of diagnosing a type of flu strain in a 
patient showing several symptoms. The symptoms speak in favor of Influenza A, but 
symptoms are only probabilistically related to flu strains. Thus the physician knows that her 
diagnosis will only be correct with a certain probability. Meanwhile she knows that her 
colleague has diagnosed a case of the relatively harmless Influenza C in the same patient. 
What should she do: Rely on the symptoms that she has observed or follow her colleague’s 
judgment? If she follows her colleague’s judgment this would be a typical case of conformity 
behavior, because she is disregarding the evidence the patient’s symptoms provide. Can such 
a conformity decision be reasonable? 
To explain why people conform it is helpful to distinguish two types of social 
influence: normative social influence and informational social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 
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1955). Normative social influence describes behavior that has been driven by the desire to 
achieve a valued, coherent self-identity and to convey a particular impression to others 
(Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996). The influence is based on people’s motivation to gain 
approval and avoid rejection by conforming with others’ expectations. The physician’s 
decision to conform may be motivated by the desire to avoid looking ridiculous in front of 
others because she was incapable of diagnosing the harmless Influenza C. In contrast, 
informational social influence arises from useful and valid information that another’s opinion 
or behavior provides to improve a decision or judgment (Allen & Levine, 1971; Festinger, 
1954). If, for instance, the physician’s colleague was very experienced and potentially had 
additional information for a diagnosis, this informational influence would lead the physician 
to the correct inference that her colleague’s diagnosis is very likely correct, making her own 
conforming decision the best she can do. 
Dual-motive views of social influence have already been proposed in several domains, 
such as conformity research (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Insko, Drenan, Solomon, Smith, & 
Wade, 1983), group polarization research (Kaplan & Miller, 1983, 1987), and persuasion 
research (Wood, 2000). Criticism of such views has mainly focused on the problem of how 
the two types of influence can be separately measured and, consequently, how they interact 
(Allen, 1965; Levine & Russo, 1987; Tajfel, 1969). In many conformity studies individuals’ 
behavior is examined under two conditions: In the public condition, individuals act under the 
surveillance of others, whereas in the private condition, responses are given anonymously. If 
behavior in the public condition differs from behavior in the private condition, this is usually 
attributed to salient beliefs of the person being socially influenced by the fact that others will 
positively evaluate his or her conformity behavior. Nevertheless, normative social influence 
cannot be excluded in the private condition. Social expectations of others can also emerge 
when their presence is imagined, so they hold across public and private contexts (Wood, 
2000). Moreover, priming studies suggest that individuals’ tendency to conform can even 
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arise automatically, outside conscious awareness or voluntary control (Epley & Gilovich, 
1999; Pendry & Carrick, 2001). 
In sum, many social psychologists agree that conformity can result from informational 
and normative social influence. How the two types influence behavior is often difficult to 
measure, and whether and how they might work together is an even more complicated 
question. In the present study we examine a sequential decision-making task that helps us 
identify the different types of social influences on individual behavior. More specifically we 
examine decision making using the “information cascade paradigm” (e.g., Anderson & Holt, 
1997; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992). 
Information Cascades and Conformity Behavior 
 Bikhchandani et al. (1992) argued that people’s judgments, in principle, are based 
upon private and public information. For instance, based on a person’s own examination of a 
judgment situation, the person has access to information others have not obtained, which is 
private information. In addition, the person can consider information that is commonly 
available to everyone; this is public information. In a situation in which several individuals 
make the same decision sequentially, the decisions made by others preceding an individual’s 
own decision provide public information to that individual. An informational cascade occurs 
when it is optimal for an individual, having observed others’ preceding decisions, to follow 
the behavior of the preceding person, ignoring his or her own private information. 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) showed that such decisions are rational when following a Bayesian 
analysis of the problem, which we demonstrate below. 
Anderson and Holt (1997) examined whether information cascades actually occur. In 
their experiment, one of two urns was randomly selected by the experimenter. The two urns 
contained the same number of balls, but the composition of the balls’ color differs for the 
urns. For instance, both urns could contain three balls, with two white and one black ball for 
the first urn (Urn A) and two black and one white ball for the second urn (Urn B). The 
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participants knew the compositions of the two urns but did not know which urn was randomly 
selected by the experimenter. Participants decided sequentially which of the two urns had 
been selected. Before making a decision, each participant drew one ball from the selected urn 
and observed its color, which was not revealed to the other participants (i.e., private 
information) and the drawn ball was afterwards put back into the urn. Thereafter, each 
participant publicly announced his or her decision. Thus, participants had private information, 
which was the color of the drawn ball from the chosen urn, and public information, which was 
the decisions of the preceding participants (but not their private signals). To make a correct 
prediction, participants could use both types of information. 
More precisely, according to a Bayesian analysis of the problem, the posterior 
probability of an Urn A being selected could be determined by applying Bayes’ theorem: 
    (1) 
where  is the likelihood of observing the number na and nb of “a” and “b” signals 
given Urn A was selected, where “a” speaks for Urn A and “b” speaks for Urn B. Signals are 
either obtained from private draws or inferred from public decisions of others. It is easier to 
determine the log odds of the posterior probability that Urn A was selected relative to the 
posterior probability that Urn B was selected. When assuming equal a priori probabilities with 
which the two urns are selected, the log odds are defined as 
 ,    (2) 
(for details see Appendix). When the log odds ratio is positive, then the posterior probability 
of Urn A being selected is larger than the posterior probability of Urn B being selected, 
whereas a negative ratio makes Urn B more likely to be selected. Under the assumption of 
equal priors and equal likelihoods of observing a or b signals, it can be easily seen with 
Equation 2 that solely the difference in the number of “a” and “b” signals is decisive 
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(regardless of the absolute numbers of signals). For more details on the Bayesian solution to 
this problem see also Phillips and Edwards (1966), Grether (1980), Anderson and Holt 
(1997), or Hung and Plot (2001). 
The following example illustrates the Bayesian analysis of the sequential decision 
problem. Suppose there are three people, named John, Jim, and Jack, facing the decision 
problem. John draws, unobserved by the others, the first ball and publicly decides for Urn A. 
After John’s decision, Jim draws a ball and also decides for Urn A. Now it is Jack’s turn. He 
draws a “b-ball,” which indicates the selection of Urn B, but since John and Jim decided for 
Urn A, Jack infers that John has drawn an “a-ball,” since he decided for Urn A. In addition, 
Jack infers that Jim also drew an a-ball, because if he had drawn a b-ball he probably would 
have decided for Urn B, to avoid being misled by a potential mistake of John.1 Thus, Jack 
infers that two a-balls (na = 2) and one b-ball (nb = 1) have been drawn and can calculate the 
log odds for Urn A: 
, 
which are positive, so that Urn A should be selected despite the private signal supporting Urn 
B. Any subsequent decision makers should also follow the decision of the first and second 
decision makers, so that an information cascade emerges. If a fourth and fifth person drew b-
balls it would be rational for them to decide for Urn A. Thus, although after the fifth person 
three b-balls and only two a-balls have been drawn, making Urn B the most likely selected 
urn, all individuals would be acting rationally by selecting Urn A according to a Bayesian 
analysis of the private and public information available to them. 
Anderson and Holt (1997) observed a high proportion of individuals’ decisions in line 
with the illustrated Bayesian updating process, which could be replicated by a multitude of 
empirical studies (e.g., Anderson, 2001; Hung & Plott, 2001; Kübler & Weizsäcker, 2004). 
However, compared to the Bayesian solution, participants in cascade experiments seem to 
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overweight their private information relative to the public information (e.g., Bernardo & 
Welch, 2001; Goeree, Palfrey, Rogers, & McKelvey, 2007; Nöth & Weber, 2003). A recent 
meta-analysis by Weizsäcker (2010) comes to the overall conclusion that people often 
overweight their private information in comparison to public social information. 
However, we think that this conclusion needs to be limited to the artificial cascade paradigm 
examined. We think that people are often strongly influenced by other people’s behavior in 
many real-life situations and thus overweight social relative to private information. Research 
illustrating the strong impact of social influences on behavior and decision making is 
widespread; for an overview, see for instance Cialdini & Goldstein (2004). In the present 
work we illustrate with the sequential decision-making paradigm described above how the 
impact of social influence can increase due to the social context in which it is embedded. 
Moreover, we follow a cognitive modeling approach to identify the importance people give to 
private as compared to social information. 
Social influence model 
To identify the importance people give to different sources of information we suggest 
a social influence model. For this model we modify Equation 2 by separating one component 
containing private from one component containing public information: 
݈݊ ௣ሺ஺|௡ೌ,௡್ሻ௣ሺ஻|௡ೌ,௡್ሻ ൌ
ߚ௕௜௔௦ ൅ ߚ௦௢௖ ቂ∑ ௜݂ሺܽሻ ൅௜∈௔೛ೠ್೗೔೎ ∑ ௜݂ሺܾሻ௜∈௕೛ೠ್೗೔೎ ቃ ൅ ሺ2 െ ߚ௦௢௖ሻ ቂ∑ ௜݂ሺܽሻ ൅௜∈௔೛ೝ೔ೡೌ೟೐ ∑ ௜݂ሺܾሻ௜∈௕೛ೝ೔ೡೌ೟೐ ቃ (3) 
where ௜݂ሺܽሻ ൌ ln ቂ݌ሺܽ|ܣሻ݌ሺܽ|ܤሻቃ, ௜݂ሺܾሻ ൌ ln ቂ݌ሺܾ|ܣሻ݌ሺܾ|ܤሻቃ, and where the index ݅ ∈ ܽ௣௥௜௩௔௧௘, ܽ௣௨௕௟௜௖ denotes 
that the sum is reached over all private (public) “a” signals. The social importance parameter 
ߚ௦௢௖ (0 ൏ ߚ௦௢௖ ൏ 2ሻ specifies how much weight a person gives to the social as compared to 
the private information. In case of ߚ௦௢௖ > 1 the decision maker overweights social information 
and in case of ߚ௦௢௖ < 1 the decision maker overweights private information. The prior weight 
ߚ௕௜௔௦ represents any initial bias towards one of the two choice options. Where ߚ௦௢௖	= 1 and 
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ߚ௕௜௔௦ ൌ 0 the social influence model is equivalent to the Bayesian solution expressed by 
Equation 2. Note that the log odds of Equation 2 or 3 can be easily re-transformed into 
posterior probabilities by 
݌ሺܣ|݊௔, ݊௕ሻ ൌ ଵ
ଵା௘ష೗೙
೛൫ಲห೙ೌ,೙್൯
೛൫ಳห೙ೌ,೙್൯
. (4) 
The larger the posterior probability for one option, the larger should be the probability 
that a person chooses this option. Accordingly we define the choice probability with which a 
person chooses an option as a function of the option’s posterior probability of being correct: 
݌௣௘௥௦௢௡ሺܣሻ ൌ ଵଵା௘ಐൈሺ೛൫ಳห೙ೌ,೙್൯ష೛൫ಲห೙ೌ,೙್൯ሻ (5) 
where θ (10>θ>0) represents a free sensitivity parameter that specifies how sensitive a person’s 
response is to the different posterior probabilities. A large sensitivity parameter implies that the 
option with the larger posterior probability will be chosen with a larger probability. 
In sum, the social influence model allows us to quantify the importance given to 
information inferred from others’ decisions (public social information) relative to private 
information. By specifying the Bayesian solution as a special case of the model, we can test 
whether people deviate from the normative solution of probability theory. 
In the second study, below, we manipulated the hierarchical rank of a previous decision 
maker to increase its social influence and the model allows us to test whether this manipulation 
affects the social influence. This was achieved by embedding the rather artificial cascade 
paradigm into a clinical decision-making context. Thereby, we draw on the authority principle, 
which states that people are willing to follow the suggestions of someone that they see as a 
legitimate authority (Cialdini, Bator & Guadagno, 1999; Milgram, 1974). The principle works 
within hierarchical relationships, which are asymmetrical in nature and involve the 
management of dominance “in ways that maximize the interests of the more dominant 
individual and limit harm to the less dominant individual” (Bugental, 2000, p.202). We 
understand the authority principle as a specific type of normative social influence, since it is 
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based on the deference to authority norm, which is a prevailing norm in most organizations 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). However, manipulating normative social influence by 
confronting participants with a decision of a higher ranked person is a relatively weak induction 
of normative influence when compared to much more “pressurizing” homogenous majority 
opinion. 
We examined the impact of social influence in two experiments by testing to what 
extent individual decisions are affected by social influences according to the following two 
hypotheses: 
1. The informational influence hypothesis follows from a Bayesian view of 
information usage. This hypothesis states that people try to be as accurate in their judgments 
as they can be, efficiently inferring information from others’ behavior, and integrating the 
socially inferred information with their own private information to derive a decision. This 
decision can be the opposite of a decision that is reached from private information alone. 
Decision makers who behave in a manner consistent with the informational influence 
hypothesis will make decisions in line with the Bayesian model specified above (i.e., 
Equation 2). The social influence model allows us to test whether the decision maker weights 
all available information equally to make a decision, regardless of whether it is private or 
public information. 
2. The authority influence hypothesis predicts that people’s behavior will also be 
influenced by the hierarchical status of other decision makers. In line with the authority 
principle, people will make decisions that conform to higher ranked others’ decisions more 
often, even if other available public information and one’s own private information suggest 
doing otherwise. Behavior that is consistent with the authority influence hypothesis should be 
better described by the social influence model, which allows the decision maker to give 
greater weight to the information that is inferred from the behavior of the higher ranked other 
person. 
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The aim of the following studies was to test these two hypotheses. 
Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 was primarily to test the informational influence hypothesis. 
The experimental task was constructed in such a way as to minimize normative social 
influence on people’s decisions, so that conformity behavior will largely express the 
informational social influence of others. If people’s decisions are consistent with the Bayesian 
model, as suggested by Bikhchandani et al. (1992), this will indicate that individuals’ 
decisions reflect a rational information integration process of privately and socially inferred 
information. In Study 1 we fit the social influence model to participants’ decisions to see how 
and whether people’s behavior deviates from the Bayesian solution. 
The experimental task was similar to that used by Anderson and Holt (1997). 
However, to increase the experimental control, participants were not confronted with real urns 
from which balls were drawn. Instead they had to make judgments for a series of hypothetical 
scenarios (see Huck & Oechssler (2000) for a similar experimental procedure). This allowed 
us to systematically vary the information given to each participant. In contrast, in the 
experiment by Anderson and Holt participants had to announce their decisions to a group, so 
that normative social influence cannot be ruled out completely. In Study 1 participants were 
additionally asked to estimate the probability that their predictions were correct, so that we 
could compare it to the posterior probabilities derived by the Bayesian model (see Equation 
2). 
Method 
Participants. A total of 40 students from different departments at the University of Basel 
participated in the 30-minute experiment. Participants received course credit or a book 
voucher worth 10 Swiss Francs. In addition, participants were informed that one of their 
decisions would be selected randomly, and if that decision were correct they would be 
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rewarded with 2 Swiss Francs. If their corresponding confidence rating lay within the range of 
+-5% of the Bayesian solution they would receive an additional 2 Swiss Francs. 
Procedure. Participants received a questionnaire with a description of the urn decision 
scenario, with two urns, each containing three balls, where Urn A had one black and two 
white balls and Urn B had two black and one white ball. Participants were instructed that one 
urn was randomly chosen at the beginning of the task by the experimenter and a maximum of 
four persons had the task of sequentially inferring which of the two urns was randomly 
chosen. They were told that four persons each sequentially drew one ball from the selected 
urn, which they replaced in the urn after they privately observed the ball’s color. Thereafter 
each person announced which urn he or she considered most likely to have been chosen. Thus 
each person knew the predicted urn of her or his predecessors (but not the color of their drawn 
balls). It was also explained that each person in the urn scenario had observed his or her 
predecessors’ decisions. Participants were told they should play the role of the person who 
made the last decision, in a total of 24 different scenarios. 
After the situation description, participants received the 24 scenarios in a randomized 
order, in which the color of the ball that the last person had drawn and the decisions of the 
preceding persons were provided. The 24 scenarios presented 12 different decision tasks, 
where all possible combinations of up to four decision makers were specified. Decision 
sequences where participants were confronted with an unreasonable preceding decision 
(according to the Bayesian solution) were not included in our scenarios. The 12 decision tasks 
were presented in two different ways; that is, the decision sequences were mirrored in terms 
of the color of the balls and the decisions of the preceding persons. Thus, each participant 
decided twice on the same decision task. Participants were asked to predict for each scenario 
which urn (A or B) was most likely to have been randomly chosen by the experimenter. In 
addition, they had to judge the probability with which they thought their decision was correct 
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(on a scale of 50–100%). Tables 1 and 2 together summarize 12 decision tasks with the 
corresponding posterior probabilities. 
Results 
We first analyzed whether participants' decisions were in line with the Bayesian 
solution. The fifth column of Table 1 shows the proportion of choices in line with the 
Bayesian solution (see Equation 1). For all tasks where the posterior probability was in favor 
of one alternative (Scenarios 1–9), 86.9% of all choices were consistent with the Bayesian 
prediction. In particular, when the Bayesian prediction was in favor of a participant’s private 
signal, 90.2% of all choices were consistent with the prediction. To determine whether 
information cascades occurred, Scenarios 6 and 8 are crucial. Here the Bayesian solution 
predicts that the private signal should be disregarded in favor of the previous decisions. A 
high degree of cascade behavior consistently occurred: Of all 160 choices, 120 (75.5%) were 
consistent with the Bayesian prediction. 
In situations with posterior probabilities of p = .50 (Scenarios 10–12), private and 
public information cancel each other out. These scenarios allow us to test whether public 
social information has a stronger influence than private information. As shown in Table 2, in 
79.9% of all choices participants decided in line with their private signal, thus participants 
gave more weight to their own information than to the public information1. In sum, the results 
show that participants used the information provided by others’ decisions in a way that is 
consistent with a Bayesian analysis of the decision problem, supporting the informational 
influence hypothesis. 
To examine in more detail how much weight participants gave to public information 
relative to private information, we estimated the importance (ߚ௦௢௖ሻ, the bias (ߚ௕௜௔௦), and the 
sensitivity (ߠሻ parameters of the social influence model on the basis of the observed data. We 
estimated the model by following a Bayesian approach for each participant (cf. Kruschke, 
2010a, 2010b, 2011). This approach provides a posterior probability distribution of each of 
SOCIAL INFLUENCES IN SEQUENTIAL DECISION MAKING  14 
the model's free parameters. For each parameter, we first specified a prior distribution 
expressing the initial belief in every possible parameter. For the ߚ௕௜௔௦ parameter we assumed 
a prior truncated normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 10, 
truncated at +1 and -1. For the social importance parameter ߚ௦௢௖	we assumed a prior uniform 
distribution ranging from 0 to 2 (specified by a beta distribution). Likewise we assumed a 
uniform prior distribution ranging from 0 to 10 for the sensitivity parameter ߠ (specified by a 
beta distribution). According to the Bayesian approach, the prior distributions are then 
updated on the basis of the data and the model's likelihood function (i.e., Equation 5). 
Technically we relied on JAGS (Plummer, 2003) through the rjags interface in R (R 
Development Core Team, 2011). For the sampler we chose a thinning factor of 100 (to 
minimize autocorrelation) and an initial burn-in of 10000 (to produce more representative 
samples from the posterior). The final Markov chains had a net length of approximately 
50,000. Group estimates for the parameters of the model were derived by averaging the 
posterior distributions of all participants (by averaging the results of the Markov chains). The 
derived distributions of the means can be used to calculate summary statistics (e.g., median, 
95% highest density interval; HDI2, etc.). 
 For the social influence model the median estimated sensitivity parameter was θ = 
6.08 (95% HDI = 5.57 – 6.58), which implies that participants reacted rather sensitively to the 
different posterior probabilities. For instance, with a value of 6.08 for the sensitivity 
parameter, Urn A will be chosen with a probability of .89 given a posterior probability of .67 
for Urn A. For ߚ௕௜௔௦ the estimated median parameter value was -0.12 (95% HDI = -0.22 – -
0.01), which indicates a slight tendency to favor Urn B a priori. The median importance 
parameter given to the public information was ߚ௦௢௖ = 0.78 (95% HDI = 0.71 – 0.86), which 
shows that participants weighted public information less strongly than private information. 
When contrasting the weight given to private information (2- ߚ௦௢௖) with the weight given to 
public information (ߚ௦௢௖ሻ a median positive difference of 0.44 results (95% HDI = 0.28 – 
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0.59), illustrating overweighting of private information. In sum, the analysis shows that 
participants overweight private as compared to public information—inconsistent with the 
Bayesian model that weights all information equally. 
In addition to making choices between the two urns the participants had to judge the 
probability that their choices were correct. The probability judgments, reported in the last 
columns of Tables 1 and 2, did not match the Bayesian posterior probabilities. Whereas the 
average probability judgment of .59 was higher than the posterior probability of .50 in 
Scenarios 10-12, for scenarios with a posterior probability of .67, .80, and .89 the average 
probability judgments of .61, .69, and .74, respectively, were lower. These results appear 
similar to the standard conservatism phenomena reported in the early literature on probability 
judgments (Edwards, 1968), according to which people tend to give less moderate probability 
judgments. However, our social influence model might give an alternative explanation for 
these deviations. The social influence model, which we propose, predicts the probability with 
which people will select one or the other option (see Equation 5). These predictions follow 
from the models' predicted subjective posterior probabilities that one or the other option is 
correct. Therefore people's confidence judgments can also be compared to these subjective 
posterior probabilities that the model predicts. Importantly, the model was estimated solely on 
the basis of participants' choices ignoring their confidence judgments. Therefore predicting 
participants' confidence judgments represents a strong generalization test of the social 
influence model. 
Figure 1A shows that the model predicts the observed confidence judgments very 
accurately. Importantly, the model also predicts overweighting of small probabilities and 
underweighting of large probabilities. For instance, the model correctly predicts a confidence 
level of 61% compared to people's observed confidence levels of 59% in situations in which 
the normative Bayesian account predicts a posterior probability of 50%. Similarly, for 
situations with a normative posterior probability of 89%, the model predicts a confidence 
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judgment of 83% compared to the empirically observed confidence judgment of 75%. Thus, 
the social influence model can predict the observed deviations of people's confidence 
judgments from the normative account. According to the social influence model these 
deviations result from overweighting individual as compared to public information. For 
instance, in the normative indifference situation with posterior probabilities of 50% 
overweighting private information leads to increased confidence, whereas in situations with 
normative high posterior probabilities overweighting private information leads to more 
moderate confidence levels. 
Discussion of Study 1 
Study 1 shows that people decided to conform and go against their own private signal 
depending on whether the posterior probabilities spoke for or against their private signal. In 
situations where private and public information cancelled each other out, the private 
information was preferred over public information. These results suggest that private 
information and socially inferred information are cognitively integrated. Furthermore, the 
results replicate Anderson and Holt’s (1997) findings, where the participants made real draws 
from the urns. Our hypothetical scenarios have the advantage of maximizing experimental 
control. For instance, the scenarios minimize potential normative social influences of other 
people present in a public setting. Therefore, our results illustrate the impact of informational 
social influence leading to conformity behavior. The results of the social influence model 
show that participants overweight private as compared to public information, contrary to 
equal weighing of the Bayesian model. Likewise, participants’ probability judgments do not 
correspond to the Bayesian solution. These deviations from the Bayesian posterior 
probabilities could be explained by the social influence model. According to the social 
influence model people overweight their private information as compared to social 
information, which on average in the tested situations lead to more moderate confidence 
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judgments. Importantly the model predicts these deviations from the Bayesian account 
without being fitted to the observed confidence judgments. 
Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 was to investigate decision making in a real-life situation in 
which both informational and authority influences may affect people’s decisions. Therefore, 
in Study 2 the decision problem of Study 1 was embedded in a medical decision-making 
context. Participants had to take on the role of an assistant physician who had to diagnose, on 
the basis of particular symptoms, from which of two diseases a patient was suffering. The task 
was analogous to that of Study 1: The assistant physicians had information about others’ 
decisions; here, the previously made diagnoses of other physicians recorded in the patient’s 
record. The other physicians’ decisions were often not supported by the private information 
available to the assistant physician. Again, these decisions represent informational social 
influence to the assistant physician. To examine social influences of the hierarchical status of 
preceding decision makers, the cascade paradigm offers the opportunity to control the 
strength of authority influences by varying the hierarchical ranking of the preceding decision 
makers. At the same time, we can control the strength of informational influences by 
determining the validity of available information that the decision makers in a sequence draw 
on. In the following, we explain how we manipulate both types of social influences to 
examine the influence of authority relative to informational social influences. 
To manipulate authority influence, the hierarchical ranking of the influence source 
was varied: The preceding decisions were made either by a colleague (another assistant 
physician) with the same hierarchical ranking or by a supervisor (the medical director) with a 
higher hierarchical ranking. This manipulation varied the strength of the authority influence 
by focusing on the legitimate power of previous decision makers in relation to the assigned 
hierarchical ranking of the participant’s role. Although our participants did not expect any 
negative consequences when deciding against the diagnosis of the medical director, we argue 
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that the tendency to conform should emerge as a result of the perceived hierarchical status 
difference in line with priming studies on conformity (Epley & Gilovich, 1999; Pendry & 
Carrik, 2001). To control the strength of informational social influences, participants were 
told that the average accuracy of the assistant physicians’ and the medical director’s 
diagnoses on the specific decision problem was the same. This allowed us to test the 
informational influence hypothesis and the authority influence hypothesis within the same 
task. 
In Study 2, 40 scenarios were employed in which participants were confronted with 
the same 12 decision tasks of Study 1. In order to test our hypotheses, we created all possible 
variations of the same decision task in terms of varying hierarchical rankings of the previous 
decision makers. More specifically, 40 scenarios for all possible decision sequences for up to 
four decision makers were created, in which the medical director and assistant physicians 
decide at all positions in the decision sequence with corresponding diagnoses. Again, we 
excluded scenarios with unreasonable preceding decisions (according to a Bayesian analysis), 
e.g., scenarios where two decisions favoring the same diagnosis are followed by an opposed 
decision. In sum, we created four scenarios with one previous decision maker (one with the 
assistant physician and one with the medical director as previous decision makers favoring or 
opposing participants’ private information), 12 scenarios with two previous decision makers 
and 24 with three previous decision makers (see Tables 3–6 in Column 1 and 2 for the 
scenarios used in Study 2). 
In a next step, we structured the scenarios according to the corresponding Bayesian 
predictions, resulting in four groups of scenarios (scenarios with a posterior probability of .50, 
.67, .80, and .89; see Tables 3–6). This study design allowed us to test both social influence 
hypotheses. According to the informational influence hypothesis, we should obtain no 
differences in participants’ decision making and probability judgments in (the four groups of) 
scenarios where the Bayesian solution is the same. However, according to the authority 
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influence hypothesis, participants’ decisions should vary depending on (a) whether the 
decision of the higher ranked decision maker (the medical director) supports or speaks against 
participants’ privately held information and (b) whether the medical director is one of the 
preceding decision makers or not. Due to the same informational value of previous decisions, 
independently of the hierarchical status of preceding decision makers, changes in participants’ 
decision making and probability judgments within a scenario group (i.e., a group of scenarios 
with the same Bayesian solution) could be traced back to the impact of the hierarchical status 
of previous decision makers. Therefore, we calculated the average proportion of participants’ 
decisions in favor of their private information for the following three types of scenarios 
(within each of the four groups of scenarios i.e., of scenarios with a posterior probability of 
.50, .67, .80, and .89) (see Table 3-6): 
1. Scenarios in which only assistant physicians are the preceding decision makers 
(baseline condition) 
2. Scenarios in which the medical director’s decision supports participants’ private 
information 
3. Scenarios in which the medical director’s decision speaks against participants’ 
private information 
According to the authority hypothesis, we predict that (a) participants should decide 
more strongly according to their private information (and should be more confident) when the 
medical director supports it relative to decisions in the baseline condition (i.e., comparing 
scenarios b to a); and (b) participants should decide less according to their private information 
(and should be less confident) when the medical director’s decision speaks against it relative 
to decisions in scenarios of the baseline condition (i.e., comparing scenarios c to a). 
Method 
Participants. A total of 40 students from different departments at the University of 
Basel participated in the experiment, which took approximately one hour. Participants 
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received a course credit or a book voucher worth 10 Swiss Francs. In addition, participants 
were informed that one of their diagnoses would be selected randomly, and if that diagnosis 
were correct according to the Bayesian solution they would be rewarded with 2 Swiss Francs. 
If their corresponding confidence rating lay within the range of +-5% of the Bayesian solution 
they would receive an additional 2 Swiss Francs. 
Procedure. First, participants received a description of a hypothetical situation in a 
hospital. They were asked to imagine themselves in the position of an assistant physician who 
had to make a decision concerning a patient’s disease. Participants were told about two 
possible diseases, which were a priori equally likely: sigma diverticulitis and appendicitis. 
Both diseases were probabilistically related to two independently occurring symptoms. 
Participants were informed that the patient suffered from one of the two symptoms; this 
constituted the private information of the participant. The first symptom, regurgitation, was 
more often observed when patients suffered from sigma diverticulitis; that is, the conditional 
probability of observing the symptom when the patient suffered from the disease was 
p(regurgitation|sigma diverticulitis) = .67, whereas the conditional probability of observing 
the symptom when the patient suffered from appendicitis was p(regurgitation|appendicitis) = 
.33. The second symptom, twinges in the left underbelly, was more often observed when 
patients suffered from appendicitis; that is, p(twinges in the left underbelly|appendicitis) = 
.67, whereas the symptom was less often observed when patients suffered from sigma 
diverticulitis; that is, p(twinges in the left underbelly|sigma diverticulitis) = .33. 
In addition, the scenarios provided public information concerning the previous 
diagnoses made by other assistant physicians and/or the medical director, which were 
recorded in the patient’s record. Participants were informed about the average accuracy of the 
assistant physician and the medical director when making an independent diagnosis, that is, a 
diagnosis without knowing other physicians’ diagnoses. Participants were told that an 
independent diagnosis of the assistant physician and the medical director was correct in 2 out 
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of 3 cases (p = .67). Thus, the decisions of all preceding decision makers (independently of 
their hierarchical rank) have the same validity of being correct. 
After the initial situation was described, 40 decision scenarios were given to the 
participants in a randomized order. The 40 scenarios provided the participants with the 
symptom of the patient and the previous diagnoses. Tables 3–6 summarize the 40 decision 
scenarios with the corresponding posterior probabilities. For each scenario participants were 
asked to predict which disease (appendicitis or sigma diverticulitis) the patient had developed. 
In addition, they were asked to judge the probability with which they thought their diagnosis 
would be correct (on a scale of 50–100%). 
Results 
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine individuals’ decision making in relation to the 
predictions of the informational and the authority influence hypotheses. We broke down our 
analysis into three parts: First, we present the results of testing the informational influence 
hypothesis. Next, we describe the results of examining the authority influence hypothesis. 
Finally, we fit the observed decisions with the social influence model describing the interplay 
between informational and authority influences. 
Informational social influences. To examine whether participants behaved according 
to the Bayesian analysis of the decision problem, we first analyzed their decisions. The fifth 
column of Tables 3–5 shows the proportion of participants who made choices in line with the 
posterior probabilities derived from the Bayesian analysis (see Equation 2). For all scenarios 
in which the posterior probability was in favor of one disease (Scenarios 1–30), 92.0% of all 
choices were consistent with the Bayesian prediction. In particular, when the Bayesian 
prediction was in favor of a participant’s private information, 95.1% of all choices were 
consistent with the prediction. To determine if informational cascades occurred, Scenarios 3, 
4 and 9–13 are crucial (Table 3). Here the Bayesian solution predicts that the private signal 
should be ignored in favor of the previous decisions. Consistently, a high degree of cascade 
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behavior occurred: Of all 280 decisions, 230 (82.1%) were consistent with the Bayesian 
prediction. 
In situations with posterior probabilities of p = .50 (Scenarios 31–40), private and 
public information cancel each other out. Similarly to Study 1, these scenarios allow us to test 
whether public information has a stronger influence than private information. As shown in 
Table 6, in only 49.7% of all diagnoses did participants decide in line with their private 
signal. To explain this result it is important to examine the influence of the authority influence 
presented in the next section. Overall, the results show that participants used information 
provided by others’ decisions consistent with a Bayesian analysis of the problem, supporting 
the informational influence hypothesis. 
Authority influences. In order to examine the authority influence on participants’ 
decisions, we first analyzed whether participants in general decided against or with the 
diagnosis of the medical director. We had 1119 diagnosis decisions in scenarios where the 
medical director was one of the preceding decision makers. Of these, 838 (74.89%) were in 
line with the diagnosis of the medical director. However, to evaluate the impact of authority, 
it is crucial to focus on participants’ diagnoses and probability judgments with regard to (1) 
the Bayesian prediction of each decision scenario and (2) the comparison of scenarios with 
and without the medical director as preceding decision maker supporting or disapproving 
participants’ private information. Therefore, we draw on four scenario groups (see Tables 3–
6), in which each scenario had the same posterior probability of one disease (Scenarios 1–30) 
or the posterior probabilities predict an indifference situation (Scenarios 31–40). 
The authority hypothesis predicts that (a) participants should decide more strongly 
according to their private information (and should be more confident) when the medical 
director’s decision supports their private information relative to decisions in scenarios of the 
baseline condition where the medical director is not one of the preceding decision makers. 
Likewise, (b) participants should decide less according to their private information (and 
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should be less confident) when the medical director’s decision speaks against their private 
information relative to decisions in scenarios of the baseline condition. 
We began with scenarios for which the posterior probability of one disease according 
to a Bayesian analysis is .67 (see Table 3). The average proportion of participants’ decisions 
favoring the private information is higher in scenarios where the medical director supports 
participants’ private information compared to the baseline scenarios where the medical 
director is not one of the previous decision makers (z = -5.12, p = .001 according to a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Moreover, we found a lower average proportion of decisions 
according to private information in scenarios where the medical director decided against 
participants’ private information compared to the decisions at the baseline scenarios (z = -
4.85, p = .001). Participants’ probability judgments with M = .69 were higher in scenarios 
where the medical director’s decision supported participants’ private information compared to 
the baseline condition with M = .65; (t(39) = -2.54, p = .015). However, the probability 
judgments for scenarios where the medical director’s decision speaks against participants’ 
private information with M = .66 were not different to the probability judgments for the 
baseline scenarios with M = .65, (p = .07). 
Next, we present the results of comparing participants’ decisions in scenarios for 
which the posterior probability of one disease according to a Bayesian analysis is .80 (see 
Table 4). We found no significant difference of the average proportions of decisions 
according to the private information between scenarios where the medical director’s decision 
favors the private information and the baseline scenarios (p = .65). However, participants 
decided less often according to their private information in scenarios where the decision of the 
medical director spoke against their private information compared to their decisions in the 
baseline scenarios (z = -2.23, p = .026), supporting our authority influence hypothesis. No 
significant differences in the probability judgments could be observed between scenarios 
where the medical director’s decision favored the private information and the baseline 
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scenarios. However, participants’ decisions against the medical director’s decisions showed a 
significantly lower confidence (M = .67) compared to the confidence judgments in the 
baseline scenarios (M = .77) (t(39) = 4.36, p = .001). 
In scenarios in which the posterior probability of one disease is .89 (Table 5), we 
found no significant differences in participants’ average proportion of decisions in line with 
their private information between scenarios where the medical director’s decision corresponds 
to participants’ private signal and the baseline scenarios (p = .32) whereas their probability 
judgments significantly differed between both conditions (t(39) = -3.55, p = .001) in the 
direction of a higher confidence for decisions which correspond with the medical director’s 
decision. 
Lastly, we analyzed decisions and probability judgments in scenarios where the 
posterior probabilities for both diseases were the same, with .50 predicting indifference for 
the diagnoses (see Table 6). We found no significant differences between scenarios where the 
decision of the medical director favors participants’ information and decisions made in the 
baseline scenarios. Consistent with the authority influence hypothesis, we found a 
significantly lower average proportion of participants’ decisions in line with their private 
information in scenarios with participants’ private information opposite to the medical 
director’s decision compared to the baseline scenarios where the medical director is not one of 
the preceding decision makers (z = -3.42, p = .001). Participants’ probability judgments were 
significantly higher in scenarios where the medical director supports the private information 
(M = .69) compared to the probability judgments at the baseline scenarios (M = .63) (t(39) =-
5.18, p = .001). Moreover, the probability judgments in scenarios where the decisions of the 
medical director speak against participants’ private information (M = .65) were significantly 
higher compared to the probability judgments at the baseline scenarios (t(39) = -2.54, p = 
.015). 
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In sum, we found strong empirical evidence for our authority hypothesis when 
comparing participants’ decisions in scenarios without the medical director as preceding 
decision maker (baseline scenarios) with scenarios, in which the medical directors’ decision 
contradicts participants’ private information. Here, the average proportion of decisions 
according to private information indicates a consistent tendency to follow authority 
influences. The analysis of the impact of authority influences supporting participants’ private 
information provided evidence that for scenarios with a posterior probability of .67 
participants more often decided according to their private information (compared to their 
decisions at the baseline scenarios), whereas this influence was not observed for scenarios 
with posteriors of .80 and .89. This could be due to a ceiling effect, because for the scenarios 
with high posterior probabilities we had already observed high proportions of decisions in line 
with private information in the baseline scenarios. However, the probability judgments were 
consistently higher in scenarios with a supporting decision of the medical director compared 
to the probability judgments in the baseline scenarios illustrating an authority influence. 
The social influence model. Finally, we estimated the social influence model on the 
basis of participants’ decisions. The goal in Study 2 was to distinguish informational from 
authority influence. Therefore, we decomposed the public information component within 
Equation 3 into two components instead of only one; one referring to information from higher 
ranked decision makers and one referring to information from equally ranked decision 
makers, providing: 
݈݊ ௣ሺ஺|௡ಲ,௡ಳሻ௣ሺ஻|௡ಲ,௡ಳሻ ൌ ߚ௕௜௔௦ ൅
ߚ௛௜௚௛௘௥ ቂ∑ ௜݂ሺܽሻ ൅௜∈௔೛ೠ್೗೔೎	೓೔೒೓೐ೝ	ೝೌ೙ೖ೐೏ ∑ ௜݂ሺܾሻ௜∈௕೛ೠ್೗೔೎	೓೔೒೓೐ೝ	ೝೌ೙ೖ೐೏ ቃ ൅
ߚ௘௤௨௔௟ ቂ∑ ௜݂ሺܽሻ ൅௜∈௔೛ೠ್೗೔೎	೐೜ೠೌ೗	ೝೌ೙ೖ೐೏ ∑ ௜݂ሺܾሻ௜∈௕೛ೠ್೗೔೎	೐೜ೠೌ೗	ೝೌ೙ೖ೐೏ ቃ ൅ ൫3 െ ߚ௛௜௚௛௘௥ െ
ߚ௘௤௨௔௟൯ ቂ∑ ௜݂ሺܽሻ ൅௜∈௔೛ೝ೔ೡೌ೟೐ ∑ ௜݂ሺܾሻ௜∈௕೛ೝ೔ೡೌ೟೐ ቃ (6) 
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where ߚ௛௜௚௛௘௥ refers to the importance given to the information derived from the decisions of 
the higher ranked medical director and ߚ௘௤௨௔௟ refers to the importance given to the 
information derived from the decisions of the equally ranked assistant physician. In the case 
of ߚ௛௜௚௛௘௥ = 1 and ߚ௘௤௨௔௟ = 1 the social influence model specified by Equation 6 is identical 
with the pure Bayesian model (see Equation 2). To estimate the four free parameters 
(ߚ௕௜௔௦, ߚ௛௜௚௛௘௥, ߚ௘௤௨௔௟	ܽ݊݀	ߠ - see Equation 6) of the social influence model for every 
participant in Study 2 we applied the same Bayesian approach as used in Study 1 (except that 
we used a precision (SD= 1/ඥ݌ݎ݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊	) of 0.01 instead of 0.1 for the prior distribution of 
ߚ௕௜௔௦)3. 
 The median estimated sensitivity parameter for the social influence model in Study 2 
was θ = 7.37 (95% HDI = 6.9 – 7.85), thus just a little higher than in Study 1. The median 
parameter estimate for ߚ௕௜௔௦ was 0.06 (95% HDI = -0.02 – 0.13), indicating no a priori bias 
toward one of the two decision options. The median importance parameter for 
ߚ௣௨௕௟௜௖	௛௜௚௛௘௥	௥௔௡௞ was 1.12 (95% HDI = 1.05 – 1.19), which was higher as compared to the 
median importance parameter ߚ௣௨௕௟௜௖	௘௤௨௔௟	௥௔௡௞	= 0.85 (95% HDI = 0.78 – 0.91). The contrast 
between the two parameters ߚ௣௨௕௟௜௖	௛௜௚௛௘௥	௥௔௡௞ - ߚ௣௨௕௟௜௖	௘௤௨௔௟	௥௔௡௞ was positive with a median 
difference of 0.27 (95% HDI = 0.15 – 0.39). The median weight for the private information of 
1.03 (95% CI = 0.97 – 1.10) shows that participants gave more weight to private information 
than public information derived from the decisions of the equally ranked doctors 
(Mediandifference = 0.19 (95% HDI = 0.08 – 0.30). However, private information was not 
treated differently when compared to the importance given to information derived from the 
decisions of the higher ranked doctors (Mediandifference = -0.09 (95% HDI = -0.21 – 0.04). 
Therefore, the results of the social influence model show that people give greater weight to 
public information derived from higher ranked individuals than public information derived 
from equally ranked individuals. Furthermore, in line with the results of Study 1 people 
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overweight private information when compared to social information derived from equally 
ranked persons. 
Similar to Study 1 we compared the actual to the predicted confidence judgments of 
participants (see Figure 1B). Again, this test of the social influence model is performed purely 
on the predicted subjective probabilities that were derived from the model, which were 
estimated on the basis of participants' decisions. Thus, participants' confidence judgments 
were not used at all to fit the model. Again, the social influence model was able to predict 
people's confidence judgments very accurately. 
Discussion of Study 2 
The results of Study 2 support the view that individuals are affected by informational 
and authority influences. Consistently, the majority of participants made decisions that can be 
regarded as rational when considering the sequential decision problem from a Bayesian 
perspective. This holds for scenarios in which, according to a Bayesian analysis, the posterior 
probability of one disease is above .50. Authority influences could be observed when the 
decision of the medical director contradicted participants’ private information (compared to 
the baseline condition), independently of the corresponding posterior probability of the 
scenarios. The average proportion of decisions according to private information and 
probability judgments was consistently lower, illustrating the authority influences. With 
regard to the impact of authority influences supporting participants’ private information, only 
the analysis of participants’ probability judgments reveals a consistent pattern; that is, higher 
confidence in one’s own decision when the previous decision of the medical director is in line 
with participants’ private information. Finally, the results of our social influence model reveal 
that people treat public information differently due to its normative quality and independent 
of its validity. Moreover, the social influence model was also able to predict people's 
confidence judgments quite accurately, importantly without making use of the confidence 
data to estimate the model's parameter. 
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General Discussion 
The primary goal of our studies was to examine how individuals’ decisions are 
influenced by the decisions of others. Therefore, we tried to manipulate informational and 
authority influences by embedding a social decision task into different contexts. Using the 
cascade paradigm, we were able to trace back the effects of the two influence types on 
people’s decisions. Study 1 shows that individuals do integrate socially inferred information 
to make a decision consistent with a Bayesian analysis. Study 2 shows the impact of authority 
and informational social influences on individual decision making. Authority influence affects 
people’s judgment most when the decision of a higher ranked individual is opposed to 
participants’ private information. In these types of situations, people show stronger 
conformity behavior and lower confidence in their own private information compared to 
situations in which they are confronted with opposing decisions of similar hierarchically 
ranked individuals. Additionally, we found consistent authority influences on participants’ 
probability judgments when previous authority decisions supported participants’ private 
information. 
As a consequence, one can assume that the impact of authority influence should foster 
the emergence of information cascades. In Study 1 the majority of our participants decided in 
indifference situations according to their private information (on average 79.9% of all 
participants, Scenarios 10–12, see Table 2). In Study 2 the majority of our participants 
decided in indifference situations against their private information (on average 61.5% of all 
participants, Scenarios 36–40, see Table 6) when authority influences were exerted. Given the 
risk that two decision makers may have unfortunately obtained private information indicating 
the wrong state of affairs and that subsequent decision makers have followed them, the results 
of Study 2 reveal that only one authority decision will suffice to start a cascade, independently 
of subsequent privately obtained information. 
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The results of Studies 1 and 2 show that people apparently use social information to 
make decisions in a way that is generally consistent with a Bayesian perspective of the 
sequential decision problem. However, quantifying social influences with our computational 
model based on participants’ choices shows that the weight people give to social and private 
information is context-dependent and therefore deviate from the pure Bayesian analysis that 
weights both kind of information equally. In line with recent studies on cascade behavior 
(e.g., Bernardo & Welch, 2001; Goeree et al., 2007; Nöth & Weber, 2003; Weizsäcker, 2010) 
we found that participants assigned higher weights to private information relative to public 
information within an urn-and-balls-setting (Study 1). Contrary to recent studies on cascade 
behavior, embedding the decision task into a real-life context reveals that people treat public 
information derived from higher ranked individuals more seriously than public information 
derived from equally ranked individuals whereas they overweight private information as 
compared to social information derived from lower ranked persons. Therefore, we argue that 
normative social influence cannot be neglected when analyzing the occurrence of information 
cascades in real-life settings. Moreover, the model, which was estimated only on the basis of 
participants' choices, was also able to predict people's confidence judgments. For Study 1 and 
Study 2 the model was able to explain why people's confidence judgments deviate from the 
posterior probabilities of the Bayesian account. 
The current research throws new light on the motivational grounds of conformity by 
clarifying the role of informational social influence in relation to authority influence. The 
findings of both studies highlight the cognitive aggregation of available public and private 
information as a decisive factor in the occurrence of conformity. According to the 
informational hypothesis, people evaluate the validity of socially inferred information and 
integrate it to make a decision. Consistently, one can assume that people are principally 
influenced by information of others and that authority influences only marginally account for 
conformity behavior. However, in both studies we used a task in which participants’ decisions 
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could be objectively evaluated. Thus the impact of authority influence should have affected 
people’s decisions less compared to tasks where objectively correct solutions are barely 
identifiable, if at all (e.g., judging the attractiveness of persons, Klucharev, Hytönen, 
Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernández, 2009). Therefore, the results refer to social influence 
situations where the intellective properties of a task are salient (Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan & 
Miller, 1983; Laughlin, 1980). 
From an applied perspective, our results reveal that the emergence of informational 
cascades can be fostered by authority influences. In particular, in situations in which the 
decisions of higher ranked individuals should have been given the same importance as those 
of other individuals due to equal decision accuracy, our results reveal that people still assign 
more importance to the decisions of the higher ranked individual. Here, the majority of our 
participants decided against their private information and thereby will start a cascade 
independently of subsequent privately obtained information. From this one may conclude that 
even when people act rationally according to a Bayesian perspective, the group of decision 
makers might not make good decisions as a whole. Thus, interventions to support sequential 
decision-making processes should focus more on changing the design of redundant systems 
rather than on changing the individual. Here it is important to change the structure of how 
individuals make decisions. For instance, one can think of systems where individuals first 
decide without knowing the decisions of their predecessors, and thereafter the single decisions 
are aggregated in a group context. This has the advantage that all available private 
information is integrated in the decision of the group. 
Improving the reliability of sequential decision-making structures should also include 
reflections on the incentives that individuals expect. Our studies focused on situations in 
which people wanted to maximize their individual outcomes; however, social influence 
situations may differ with respect to their underlying incentive structure. On the one hand, 
there can be incentives for following the group regardless of being correct. On the other hand, 
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social influence situations can provide incentives to follow the group and to make a correct 
decision. For example, Hung and Plott (2001) provided evidence on how information 
cascades developed when decision makers were positively rewarded when their personal 
decision was identical to the majority decision. They demonstrated that the attainment of a 
group goal led to a tendency to place more weight on public information than on private 
information. Therefore, it seems important to consider the incentives people expect in 
sequential decision-making structures and whether these goals correspond with their 
individual goals. 
Our studies show that people cognitively integrate both private and public information 
for making decisions. They attach importance to the inferred information not solely based on 
their validity but also by taking into account the normative qualities of this information. 
Therefore, people make smart decisions that aim at being accurate and consistent with their 
social environment. 
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Appendix: The Bayesian analysis of the sequential decision problem 
According to a Bayesian analysis the posterior probability of Urn A being selected is 
determined by applying Bayes’s theorem:     
 
(A1) 
where  is the likelihood of obtaining the number na and nb of “a” and “b” signals 
given that Urn A was selected, where “a” speaks for Urn A and “b” speaks for Urn B. 
Analogously, the posterior probability of Urn B being selected given the number na and nb of 
“a” and “b” signals can be determined, so that the ratio of the two posterior probabilities is 
defined as 
       
 (A2) 
Assuming equal a priori probabilities of the two urns being selected and taking the logarithm 
on both sides provides 
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Footnotes 
1. These decisions are also in line with a Bayesian analysis, if one takes into account that 
people occasionally make mistakes. If one assumes that with a small probability the preceding 
persons in the sequential decision situation might have chosen the wrong urn, this increases 
the posterior probability above .50 in favor of one’s own information, so that a decision in 
line with one’s own signal should be made. For instance, we assumed that two initial A 
decisions imply two “a” draws, which means that if the second decision maker had a private 
“b” signal we assume that she would have selected Urn B. In the case of a “b” signal for the 
second decision maker the posterior probabilities are equal for both urns, but because the 
second decision maker cannot be absolutely sure that the first decision maker has not 
mistakenly selected Urn A, it is reasonable for her to go with her own signal. Nevertheless, 
even if one assumes that the second decision maker decided randomly when she got a “b” 
signal, the third decision maker should still predict Urn A (against his own “b” signal), as the 
posterior probability for Urn A is p = .56. 
2. The 95% highest density interval (HDI) is a way to summarize posterior distributions used 
in Bayesian statistics. According to Kruschke (2011) the 95% HDI can be defined as “[…] an 
interval that spans 95% of the distribution, such that every point inside the interval has higher 
believability than any point outside the interval” (p. 85). 
3. To guarantee that the three importance parameters sum up to 3 we applied the following 
procedure: In a first step two independent values (β_1 and β_2) were sampled from uniform 
beta distributions (α = 1, β = 1). The smaller value was then multiplied by 3 and defines 
β_(public equal rank). To get β_(public higher rank) we subtracted the smaller value from the 
higher value and multiplied the result by 3. Finally, the importance parameter for the private 
information was derived by subtracting β_(public equal rank) and β_(public higher rank) from 
3.  
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Tables 
Table 1 
Participants’ decisions and probability judgments for the nine decision scenarios of Study 1 
in which, according to a Bayesian solution, the posterior probability of one urn being chosen 
is above .50. 
Scenario Previous decisions 
Private 
information 
favors 
Posterior 
probability 
Choices for 
the most 
likely urn 
(%)a 
Average 
probability 
judgment 
1 Urn A Urn A .80 for A 91.3 .66 
2 Urn A; Urn A Urn A .89 for A 90.0 .74 
3 Urn A; Urn B Urn A .67 for A 91.1 .62 
4 Urn A; Urn A; Urn A Urn A .89 for A 85.0 .75 
5 Urn A; Urn B; Urn A Urn A .80 for A 85.0 .69 
6 Urn A; Urn A Urn B .67 for A 71.3 .54 
7 Urn A; Urn B Urn B .67 for B 95.0 .66 
8 Urn A; Urn A; Urn A Urn B .67 for A 79.7 .65 
9 Urn A; Urn B; Urn B Urn B .80 for B 93.8 .74 
a Most likely according to a Bayesian analysis 
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Table 2 
Participants’ decisions and probability judgments for the three decision scenarios in Study 1 
in which a Bayesian analysis leads to an indifference situation; that is, the posterior 
probability for both urns being .50. 
Scenario Previous decisions 
Private 
information 
favors 
Posterior 
probability 
Choices for 
the urn 
favored by 
private signal 
(%) 
Average 
probability 
judgment 
10 Urn A Urn B .50 90.0 .60 
11 Urn A; Urn B; Urn B Urn A .50 65.0 .60 
12 Urn A; Urn B; Urn A Urn B .50 84.8 .58 
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Table 3 
Participants’ decisions and probability judgments for the 13 decision scenarios of Study 2, in which the 
posterior probability of one disease according to a Bayesian analysis is .67. 
 
 
Scenario 
 
 
Previous diagnosis 
Private 
information 
favors 
 
 
Posterior 
probability 
Participants 
choosing the 
most likely 
disease (%)a 
Participants’ 
average 
probability 
judgment 
Average 
proportion 
of decisions 
according to 
private 
information 
Average 
proba-
bility 
judgment 
Baseline Scenarios (no previous decision of the MD)   
1 AP: A, AP: S A .67 for A 95.0 0.70  
 
.59 
 
 
.65 
2 AP: A; AP: S S .67 for S 92.5 0.66 
3 AP: A; AP: A S .67 for A 75.0 0.60 
4 AP: A; AP: A; AP: A S .67 for A 75.0 0.66 
Scenarios where the decision of the MD favors participants’ private information   
5 MD: A, AP: S A .67 for A 95.0 0.72  
.94 
 
.69 6 AP: A; MD: S S .67 for S 92.5 0.68 
Scenarios where the decision of the MD speaks against participants’ private information    
7 MD: A; AP: S S .67 for S 87.5 0.61  
 
 
.36 
 
 
 
.66 
8 AP: A, MD: S A .67 for A 82.5 0.64 
9 MD: A; AP: A S .67 for A 82.5 0.67 
10 AP: A; MD: A S .67 for A 82.5 0.65 
11 MD: A; AP: A; AP: A S .67 for A 87.5 0.70 
12 AP: A; MD: A; AP: A S .67 for A 87.5 0.72 
13 AP: A; AP: A; MD: A S .67 for A 85.0 0.71 
Note. AP = Assistant physician; MD = Medical director; A = Appendicitis; S = Sigma diverticulitis. 
a Most likely according to the Bayesian analysis 
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Table 4 
Participants’ decisions and probability judgments for the 10 decision scenarios of Study 2 in which the posterior 
probability of one disease according to a Bayesian analysis is .80. 
 
 
Scenario 
 
 
Previous diagnosis 
Private 
information 
favors 
 
Posterior 
probability 
Participants 
choosing the 
most likely 
disease (%) 
Participants’ 
average 
probability 
judgment 
Average 
proportion 
of decisions 
according to 
private 
information 
Average 
proba-
bility 
judgment 
 
Baseline Scenarios (no previous decision of the MD)   
14 AP: A A .80 for A 97.5 0.80  
.97 
 
.77 15 AP: A, AP: S; AP: A A .80 for A 95.0 0.77 
16 AP: A; AP: S; AP: S S .80 for S 97.5 0.75 
Scenarios where the decision of the MD favors participants’ private information   
17 MD: A A .80 for A 97.5 0.83  
 
.97 
 
 
.79 
18 MD: A, AP: S; AP: A A .80 for A 95.0 0.79 
19 AP: A, AP: S; MD: A A .80 for A 97.5 0.79 
20 AP: A; MD: S, AP: S S .80 for S 95.0 0.76 
21 AP: A; AP: S; MD: S S .80 for S 97.5 0.77 
Scenarios where the decision of the MD speaks against participants’ private information    
22 AP: A, MD: S; AP: A A .80 for A 90.0 0.72  
.86 
 
.67 23 MD: A; AP: S; AP: S S .80 for S 82.5 0.63 
Note. AP = Assistant physician; MD = Medical director; A = Appendicitis; S = Sigma diverticulitis. 
a Most likely according to the Bayesian analysis
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Table 5 
Participants’ decisions and probability judgments for the seven decision scenarios of Study 2 in which the 
posterior probability of one disease according to a Bayesian analysis is .89. 
 
 
Scenario 
 
 
Previous diagnosis 
Private 
information 
favors 
 
 
Posterior 
probability 
Participants 
choosing the 
most likely 
disease (%)a 
Participants’ 
average 
probability 
judgment 
Average 
proportion 
of decisions 
according to 
private 
information 
Average 
proba-
bility 
judgment 
Baseline Scenarios (no previous decision of the MD)   
24 AP: A; AP: A A .89 for A 100.0 0.84  
.98 
 
.85 25 AP: A; AP: A; AP: A A .89 for A 97.5 0.86 
Scenarios where the decision of the MD favors participants’ private information   
26 MD: A; AP: A A .89 for A 100.0 0.87  
 
1 
 
 
.88 
27 AP: A; MD: A A .89 for A 100.0 0.85 
28 MD: A; AP: A; AP: A A .89 for A 100.0 0.89 
29 AP: A, MD: A; AP: A A .89 for A 100.0 0.88 
30 AP: A, AP: A; MD: A A .89 for A 100.0 0.88 
Note. AP = Assistant physician; MD = Medical director; A = Appendicitis; S = Sigma diverticulitis. 
a Most likely according to the Bayesian analysis
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Table 6 
Participants’ decisions and probability judgments for the decision scenarios in Study 2, where the posterior 
probabilities of the medical diagnosis task predict an indifference situation between the available options. 
 
 
Scenario 
 
 
Previous diagnosis 
Private 
information 
favors 
Participants’ 
diagnosis 
according to 
their private 
information 
(%) 
Participant
s’ average 
probability 
judgment 
Average 
proportion 
of decisions 
according to 
private 
information 
Average 
probability 
judgment 
Baseline Scenarios (no previous decision of the MD)   
31 AP: A S 70.0 0.62  
.57 
 
.63 32 AP: A, AP: S; AP: S A 40.0 0.63 
33 AP: A; AP: S; AP: A S 60.0 0.66 
Scenarios where the decision of the MD favors participants’ private information   
34 MD: A, AP: S; AP: S A 75.0 0.68  
.67 
 
.69 35 AP: A; MD: S, AP: A S 60.0 0.69 
Scenarios where the decision of the MD speaks against participants’ private information  
36 MD: A S 37.5 0.62  
 
.39 
 
 
.65 
37 AP: A, MD: S; AP: S A 40.0 0.63 
38 AP: A, AP: S; MD: S A 30.0 0.66 
39 MD: A; AP: S; AP: A S 47.5 0.66 
40 AP: A; AP: S; MD: A S 37.5 0.68 
Note. AP = Assistant physician; MD = Medical director; A = Appendicitis; S = Sigma diverticulitis. 
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Figure 1. Empirically observed versus predicted confidence judgments for Study 1 (A) and 
Study 2 (B). The general pattern of confidence judgments (blue) is accurately captured by the 
predictions of the model solely derived from participants’ choices (green) for Study 1 (A) and 
Study 2 (B). 
Note. Confidence judgments on the dashed line are in accordance with the Bayesian solution. 
